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THE CHALLENGES OF NONPROFIT 
GOVERNANCE 
PETER MOLK* 
D. DANIEL SOKOL** 
Abstract: The stakes for proper nonprofit governance are extremely high. Over 
1.5 million nonprofits are registered with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 
collectively employing twelve million people and accounting for 5.6% of U.S. 
gross domestic profit. Yet whereas for-profit companies have significant checks 
on the behavior of boards and management, nonprofit firms lack many of the 
same types of internal and external governance control mechanisms. COVID-19 
is just the latest shock to expose the lack of preparedness and capability of many 
nonprofit boards in fulfilling their essential governance functions. This Article 
contributes to the corporate governance literature by identifying aspects of non-
profit governance that create unnecessary risk to nonprofit entities and to society 
overall. Currently many governance failures that would be corrected in tradition-
al for-profit entities go unaddressed among nonprofits. We make unique contribu-
tions to addressing these governance shortcomings by suggesting an enforcement 
reorientation by both public and private actors. Our novel solutions encompass 
disclosure, certification, oversight by state attorneys general, and federal actors. 
INTRODUCTION 
The size and scope of nonprofit enterprise is staggering. Nonprofits ac-
count for over a trillion dollars—or 5.6%—of U.S. gross domestic product,1 
employ twelve million people,2 pay $670 billion in wages annually,3 and pro-
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1 The Nonprofit Sector in Brief, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHARITABLE STAT. (June 18, 2020), https://
nccs.urban.org/project/nonprofit-sector-brief [https://perma.cc/XMC7-FK2C]. 
2 Business Employment Dynamics: Research Data on the Nonprofit Sector, U.S. BUREAU OF 
LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/bdm/nonprofits/nonprofits.htm [https://perma.cc/55FB-RPZT] (May 
14, 2020). 
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vide immeasurable benefit to people’s lives. Unfortunately, nonprofits’ success 
can be accompanied by extreme cases of managerial misconduct. In one of the 
most famous examples, William Aramony, the longtime leader of the nonprofit 
United Way organization, served six years in federal prison after he was con-
victed of twenty-three felony charges.4 His activity included using nonprofit 
funds to buy homes in New York City and Miami, to pay for limousine service 
and transatlantic business class flights, and to fund extramarital affairs in Paris, 
London, and Cairo.5 
The past year has been a busy one for nonprofit governance issues. The 
New York Attorney General filed suit against the National Rifle Association 
(NRA), alleging self-dealing and fraud, including a $17 million post-employ-
ment contract for its head Wayne LaPierre, expensive clothing at Beverly Hills 
shops, and lavish foreign travel. These actions may help to explain how NRA 
leadership turned a $27.8 million surplus in 2015 into a $36.3 million net deficit 
in 2018.6 The University of Southern California (USC) also was rocked by a 
series of highly publicized scandals. In one, wealthy parents sent checks to uni-
versity accounts to secure admissions spots at the university as part of sports 
recruitment, leading to guilty pleas by parents and some USC officials to bribery 
charges.7 At roughly the same time, USC also received allegations of discrimina-
tion against women by the then-dean of the business school, repeated sexual as-
saults by the campus gynecologist, allegations of potential self-dealing with the 
university by university board members,8 and alleged associations between the 
dean of the medical school and criminal elements.9 
                                                                                                                           
3 Id. 
4 T. Rees Shapiro, United Way Leader’s Fraud Scandal Marred Charitable Legacy, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 14, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/united-way-leaders-fraud-scandal-
marred-charitable-legacy/2011/11/14/gIQALnwbMN_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q7HH-UQWY]. 
5 Id. 
6 Carol D. Leonnig & Tom Hamburger, New York Attorney General Seeks to Dissolve NRA in 
Suit Accusing Gun Rights Group of Wide-Ranging Fraud and Self-dealing, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/nra-lapierre-ny-attorney-general/2020/08/06/8e3897
94-d794-11ea-930e-d88518c57dcc_story.html [https://perma.cc/QFN3-FTYQ]. 
7 Joel Rubin & Matthew Ormseth, Admissions Scandal: Charged Parents Try to Drag USC into 
the Fray, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-01-13/college-
admissions-scandal-parents-usc [https://perma.cc/EGV6-TETT]. 
8 Marjorie Valbrun, Does USC Need More Housecleaning?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 21, 2019), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/05/21/usc-board-trustees-undergo-major-changes-wake-
recent-scandals [https://perma.cc/NA3Z-VWTL]. Self-dealing is not an uncommon feature in univer-
sities. See Paul Fain et al., Divided Loyalties: One-Fourth of Private Colleges Do Business with Trus-
tees’ Companies. Whose Interests Come First?, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 14, 2010), https://
www.chronicle.com/article/Divided-Loyalties-Conflicts/64629 [https://perma.cc/GW43-99NQ]. 
9 Paul Pringle & Adam Elmahrek, USC Had Many Warnings About Medical School Dean’s Behav-
ior but Took Little Action, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-usc-
dean-20171114-story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20210203190659/https://www.latimes.com/
local/lanow/la-me-usc-dean-20171114-story.html]. There has been a “global settlement.” Vanessa Ro-
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Of course, nonprofits are not the only organizational form to experience 
compliance problems. Leaders at for-profit organizations also engage in 
wrongdoing.10 The key difference between the two, and which provides the 
launching-off point for this Article, is the set of legal mechanisms that exist to 
deter this type of failure. For-profit companies rely on robust oversight by 
boards of directors and shareholders to identify and deter managerial self-
dealing of the type described above.11 Nonprofits do not.12 Instead, as exempli-
fied in the United Way13 and USC allegations,14 nonprofits have boards that 
often engage in little meaningful duty of loyalty oversight, have no sharehold-
ers as a legal matter, and have barred other interested parties from being able to 
sue.15 These differences can provide a fertile ground for nonprofit fraud. 
Financial stresses exposed by COVID-19 only have exacerbated these 
governance differences between nonprofits and for-profits. Management at 
higher education and healthcare organizations in particular have been criticized 
for failing to plan for basic revenue disruptions of the type caused by COVID-
19. For instance, as higher education became increasingly reliant on higher 
                                                                                                                           
mo, USC Agrees to $852 Million Settlement to End Sex Abuse Litigation, NPR (Mar. 25, 2021), 
https://www.npr.org/2021/03/25/981435791/usc-agrees-852-million-settlement-to-end-sex-abuse-
litigation [https://perma.cc/3RWA-63WP]. 
10 See Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An 
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1092 (2017); Leo 
E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 
GEO. L.J. 629, 652 (2010). 
11 Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1778 (2007); Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 
709, 723 (2019); Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013, 
2015 (2019). 
12 There is also a more robust ecosystem of external monitors (some more effective than others) 
in the for-profit setting than in the nonprofit setting. This includes the areas of certification and disclo-
sure. See infra Part III.A. Private litigation against for-profits is also more robust. See C.S. Agnes 
Cheng et al., Institutional Monitoring Through Shareholder Litigation, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 356, 358 
(2010); Claire E. Crutchley et al., When Governance Fails: Naming Directors in Class Action Law-
suits, 35 J. CORP. FIN. 81, 94 (2015). Public enforcement against for-profits is also more significant 
and robust. Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: 
Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 209 (2009); Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer 
Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2176 (2010). 
13 See, e.g., Joan Beck, United Way Scandal Could Embolden Many to Just Say No, CHI. TRIB. 
(Apr. 9, 1992), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1992-04-09-9202010652-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/G4ZT-9JGL] (“A significant part of the blame belongs to United Way’s board of 
governors, who either did not know how Aramony was using contributors’ money or had no objec-
tion.”). 
14 Some blamed the then-president, Max Nikias, for creating a weak compliance culture in which 
wrongdoing was not reported. Valbrun, supra note 8. We note that universities may be different from 
many other nonprofits because of the more active role for some stakeholders in governance (faculty, 
for example, and state-level legislatures in the case of public universities), but universities still tend to 
have less monitoring than publicly traded for-profits. 
15 For additional discussion of these problems, see infra Part II. 
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tuition and enrolling international students,16 many nonprofits appeared slow 
to engage with the basic issue of planning for revenue disruptions from these 
sources.17 These organizations now find themselves in the unpleasant position 
of scrambling for solutions in response to COVID-initiated enrollment de-
clines.18 In healthcare, hospitals, most of whose revenue comes from profitable 
elective procedures,19 have found that their main source of revenue has dried 
up during COVID-19 lockdowns, requiring them to administer expensive 
treatment20 to COVID-19 patients with little anticipated revenue in exchange.21 
Again, nonprofits are not the sole organizational form to experience these 
problems. Some for-profit organizations likewise failed to anticipate economic 
disruptions of the type and magnitude caused by COVID-19. Yet the response 
among for-profits is different. Among for-profits, unhappy shareholders have 
greeted many of these basic governance failures with class-action lawsuits.22 
But nonprofits, because of differences in legal regimes, face little sanction out-
                                                                                                                           
16 See Eva Bogaty & Kendra M. Smith, Moody’s: US Higher Education Outlook Revised to Sta-
ble as Revenues Stabilize, MOODY’S INVS. SERV. (July 20, 2015), https://www.moodys.com/research/
Moodys-US-higher-education-outlook-revised-to-stable-as-revenues--PR_330530 [https://perma.cc/
PN8S-RTB6]. 
17 Caroline Spiezio, Fall LL.M. Enrollment Expected to Plummet, Bruising Law School Finances, 
REUTERS (July 22, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/lawyer-coronavirus-llm/fall-llm-enrollment-
expected-to-plummet-bruising-law-school-finances-idUSL2N2ER20A [https://perma.cc/32AC-AXA4]. 
18 Dick Startz, University Finances and COVID-19: Different Schools, Different Risks, BROOK-
INGS INST. (June 18, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brown-center-chalkboard/2020/06/18/
university-finances-and-covid-19-different-schools-different-risks/ [https://perma.cc/K3KS-BWYL]. 
19 See, e.g., Adrian Diaz et al., The COVID-19 Pandemic and Rural Hospitals—Adding Insult to 
Injury, HEALTH AFFS.: HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (May 3, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.
1377/hblog20200429.583513/full/ [https://perma.cc/A9RZ-922G] (describing how hospitals, particu-
larly those in rural areas, rely upon elective surgery to return margins to supplement high-cost/low 
return procedures, such as caring for COVID-19 patients). 
20 The Kaiser Family Foundation estimates a cost of twenty thousand dollars for treatment of a 
COVID-19 patient. Matthew Rae et al., Potential Costs of COVID-19 Treatment for People with Em-
ployer Coverage, PETERSON-KFF HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.health
systemtracker.org/brief/potential-costs-of-coronavirus-treatment-for-people-with-employer-coverage/ 
[https://perma.cc/S6DZ-GFQ5]. This cost rises to over eighty-eight thousand dollars per patient for 
patients that require the support of a ventilator. Id. 
21 Diaz et al., supra note 19 (“While hospitals are canceling profitable elective surgeries to make 
way for costly patients with COVID-19, they also have higher staffing and supply costs with no way 
to predict reimbursement.”). 
22 See, e.g., Kevin LaCroix, Securities Suit Alleges Cybersecurity Company Misrepresented 
COVID-19 Impact, D&O DIARY (June 11, 2020), https://www.dandodiary.com/2020/06/articles/
coronavirus/securities-suit-alleges-cybersecurity-company-misrepresented-covid-19-impact/ [https://
perma.cc/F65Z-UUJS]; Kevin LaCroix, Shareholder Files State Court Class Action Over COVID-19 
Impact on Planned Merger, D&O DIARY (May 19, 2020), https://www.dandodiary.com/2020/05/
articles/coronavirus/shareholder-files-state-court-class-action-over-covid-19-impact-on-planned-
merger/ [https://perma.cc/4KYK-CFPN]. 
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side the court of public opinion,23 even if the legal duties for both for-profit 
and nonprofit directors to consider these basic issues are nominally the same.24 
We seek to make strides toward correcting this differential treatment. In 
both for-profit and nonprofit settings, incentives for value creation can be bet-
ter aligned by creating more effective governance institutions.25 For-profits 
have been studied extensively, but nonprofits remain the subject of relatively 
thin amounts of research into these issues.26 We find this difference surprising, 
particularly given the size and scope of the nonprofit sector. 
We are not the first to identify potential problems with nonprofit govern-
ance. We do, however, use this observation to make two unique contributions 
to the literature. First, we conduct an exhaustive analysis into why existing 
nonprofit governance frameworks break down. Next, we use this conclusion to 
make novel, concrete, and attainable reforms for improving nonprofit govern-
ance that encompass both private and public law solutions. 
We focus on relatively larger nonprofits throughout our discussion, both 
because the ramifications of misconduct are comparatively larger and because 
larger organizations are more likely to have the governance infrastructure to 
adopt our proposals.27 Also, although a variety of criticisms have been levied 
against nonprofits, we restrict our attention mainly to the difficult problem of 
                                                                                                                           
23 See infra Part II. 
24 See, e.g., Brent Ashley, Guest Post: 7 Steps for Ensuring Director Oversight During COVID-
19, D&O DIARY (June 4, 2020), https://www.dandodiary.com/2020/06/articles/director-and-officer-
liability/guest-post-7-steps-for-ensuring-director-oversight-during-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/P2F6-
Y6XQ]. 
25 See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, 
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985) (analyzing organizations through transaction cost 
economics). 
26 Nonprofits have still been the subject of excellent research projects that have advanced the state 
of knowledge significantly. See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsi-
dies: The Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505 (2010); Brian Galle & David I. 
Walker, Nonprofit Executive Pay as an Agency Problem: Evidence from U.S. Colleges and Universi-
ties, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1881 (2014); Brian Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System, 53 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 777 (2012); Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 
(1980); M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for Altruism, 
109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 576 (2009); James R. Hines Jr. et al., The Attack on Nonprofit Status: A 
Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179 (2010); Robert A. Katz, Can Principal-Agent Models 
Help Explain Charitable Gifts and Organizations?, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 1; Jonathan Klick & Robert H. 
Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey’s Kiss-off, 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2008); Anup Malani & Guy David, Does Nonprofit Status Signal Quality?, 
37 J. LEGAL STUD. 551 (2008); Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 
VA. L. REV. 2017 (2007); Avner Ben-Ner, Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector? Reforming Law 
and Public Policy Towards Nonprofit Organizations, 104 YALE L.J. 731 (1994) (book review). 
27 Small nonprofits in aggregate also can pose sizable problems that are worthy of attention. See, 
e.g., Eric Franklin Amarante, Unregulated Charity, 94 WASH. L. REV. 1503, 1506 (2019) (analyzing 
the IRS’s decision to essentially ignore charities with under fifty thousand dollars in annual gross 
receipts).  
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addressing nonprofit managerial agency costs, which also pose one of the 
quintessential problems in corporate law.28 This problem encompasses situa-
tions in which management puts its own interests ahead of those of the organi-
zation, such as fraud, self-dealing, failures to carry out the nonprofit’s mission, 
and extreme failures of oversight and monitoring the nonprofit’s operations 
(for convenience, our discussion often lumps these together into “agency 
costs”). It does not, however, encompass all complaints made about nonprofit 
governance, such as a lack of board diversity.29 Finally, our analysis concen-
trates on commercial nonprofit corporations, rather than on donative trusts, 
although many of the problems we analyze also arise in trusts, and we think 
our proposed solutions could be fruitfully applied in that context as well.30 
Our analysis proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides a legal primer on 
nonprofits, specifying as a matter of state and federal law their similarities to, 
and differences from, other organizational forms. Nonprofits’ core distinctive 
legal feature is their prohibition on distributing earnings to private parties, but 
many implications flow from this deceptively simple statement, ranging from 
the behavior expected of management, to who has legal standing to sue for 
violations of that behavior, to the public and private disclosures that the non-
profit is required to make.31 
Part II then turns to the key problem of agency costs, which plague any 
firm—nonprofit or for-profit—in which there is separation of ownership and 
control. Much of corporate law revolves around mechanisms to mitigate these 
problems. We contrast those mechanisms that have achieved success among 
for-profit firms with the systems that are designed to curb management costs in 
nonprofit firms, and show the significant gaps that emerge when doing so.32 
Part III develops attainable ways to minimize nonprofit agency costs. We 
focus on three possibilities. The first involves reforming existing nonprofit disclo-
sure rules to facilitate a private-ordering certification-based system. The second 
leverages the current nonprofit enforcement framework that relies on state attor-
                                                                                                                           
28 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
29 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Castillo, Why Are We Still Struggling with Diversity, Equity, and Inclu-
sion in Nonprofit Governance?, NONPROFIT Q. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/why-
are-we-still-struggling-with-diversity-equity-and-inclusion-in-nonprofit-governance/ [https://perma.
cc/PU95-Q3NW]. 
30 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 
656 (1995) (detailing the presence of fiduciary duties in trust relationships); Robert H. Sitkoff, An 
Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 623 (2004) (applying an agency costs 
theory to donative trusts); Lee-ford Tritt, The Limitations of an Economic Agency Cost Theory of 
Trust Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2579, 2585 (2011) (noting some inaccuracies produced by applying 
the agency cost theory to trust property). 
 31 See infra notes 34–96 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 97–223 and accompanying text. 
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neys general; we suggest how the existing incentive framework could be recon-
ceived to promote meaningful attorney general oversight. The third considers ex-
panding existing federal oversight from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) into a 
broader system of monitoring nonprofit governance.33 We then conclude. 
I. NONPROFIT PRIMER 
State business law statutes authorize organizations of various types, with 
the menu of options catering to differing needs that the company, its promot-
ers, and its owners might have.34 This Part develops the fundamental role of 
nonprofits that follows directly from essential attributes of nonprofit state and 
federal law. Section A details the historical role of nonprofits.35 Section B then 
explains various aspects of state law to which nonprofits must adhere.36 Final-
ly, Section C discusses the impact of federal tax law on nonprofits.37 We use 
this essential nature of nonprofits that we identify in this Part to motivate our 
later inquiry into how well law and policy currently do, and might in the fu-
ture, further that purpose. 
A. The Role of Nonprofits 
It is a common misconception that nonprofits are simply organizations set 
up to leverage preferential tax treatment under federal and state law. Historical-
ly, nonprofits formed before any preferential tax treatment was offered,38 and a 
significant slice—estimated at one quarter—of nonprofits have no tax exemp-
tion today.39 What explains the role for nonprofits, if not their tax advantages? 
Professor Henry Hansmann offered a compelling theory in what has be-
come one of the most cited law review articles of all time.40 Just like corpora-
tions or limited liability companies (LLCs), nonprofit organizations are simply 
creatures of state organizational law statutes. Like any organizational form, 
then, the attributes of nonprofits are determined by state statutes. And the 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See infra notes 227–338 and accompanying text. 
34 See generally LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2010) (describing the 
increase in unincorporated business types, including partnerships and limited liability companies). 
 35 See infra notes 38–60 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 61–84 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 85–96 and accompanying text. 
38 See generally HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996) (detailing the long 
history of employee-owned companies in America). 
39 See, e.g., Am. Auto. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 19 T.C. 1146, 1162 (1953) (denying tax-exempt status 
to the American Automobile Association, or “AAA”); LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA’S NONPROFIT 
SECTOR: A PRIMER 15 (2d ed. 1999) (estimating that 25% of nonprofits have no federal tax exemp-
tion). 
40 Hansmann, supra note 26, at 837; Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Re-
view Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489, 1492 tbl.1 (2012). 
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unique feature of state nonprofit organization statutes is a prohibition on dis-
tributing net earnings to private individuals.41 A nonprofit’s excess profits 
therefore remain within the firm and are not distributed to management or 
owners. This “nondistribution constraint,” as Hansmann characterized it, pro-
vides the essential feature of the nonprofit corporate form.42 
Because private individuals are barred from withdrawing the nonprofit’s 
net earnings, nonprofits offer a commitment to trust and quality, pledging to 
refrain from taking advantage of those who interact with the firm.43 This com-
mitment derives from the theoretical assumption that firms are run in the inter-
ests of their owners: those who hold the right to appoint management and the 
right to the firm’s residual earnings.44 If management does not do what owners 
desire, owners will appoint different managers who will. We can therefore ex-
pect that whoever owns the firm will make a fundamental difference in how 
that firm is run, which drives the essential difference between nonprofits and 
traditional corporations. 
In a traditional for-profit firm, owners may have some heterogeneous in-
terests, but they are generally united in their desire to maximize the financial 
value of the firm.45 Traditional for-profit firms, therefore, have the incentive to 
wring every dollar possible out of those who interact with the firm, as doing so 
increases the value of the firm, the satisfaction of its owners, and the chance 
that management will retain its employment. 
There are, of course, some constraints on this behavior by for-profit firms, 
but these constraints are incomplete. Nonowners can bargain for particularized 
protections by contract, but contracts will necessarily be incompletely written 
and enforced, incapable of perfectly addressing every possible contingency that 
might arise in the future.46 Regulation or the desire to protect a firm-specific 
reputation for quality will fill some of the remaining gaps, but it will lessen, not 
                                                                                                                           
41 See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 13.01–.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1987) (pro-
hibiting most distributions). 
42 Hansmann, supra note 26, at 838; see also Brian Galle, Social Enterprise: Who Needs It?, 54 
B.C. L. REV. 2025, 2027–31 (2013) (detailing a number of features of the nonprofit firm). 
43 Hansmann, supra note 26, at 843–45. 
44 HANSMANN, supra note 38, at 21. 
45 Id. This is, of course, a simplification; shareholders can differ along many important dimen-
sions, such as time horizons, or the desire to even reduce (rather than increase) the financial value of 
firms. See Barbara A. Bliss, Peter Molk & Frank Partnoy, Negative Activism, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1333, 1344–68 (2020) (studying the phenomenon of activists that seek to reduce company values); 
Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 764, 805–12 (2012) (argu-
ing that corporations should nevertheless invest for the long term). 
46 Hansmann, supra note 26, at 845, 849–63 (addressing several areas of contract failure that are 
served by nonprofits). 
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eliminate, the problem, again due to the inability to provide complete deter-
rence.47 
Nonprofits step in to engender trust by nonowners because of their defin-
ing feature: their lack of a group entitled to the firm’s residual earnings, and 
therefore the lack of an incentive for management to maximize the dollars ex-
tracted from those with whom the firm interacts.48 In circumstances where 
contract, regulation, and reputation do not dictate the firm’s behavior, then, we 
will expect nonprofits, on average, to provide a higher quality product or ser-
vice than a traditional firm, because the nonprofit management’s goal is not 
dictated by maximizing the firm’s profits. Instead, management is freed to pur-
sue other goals, such as the organization’s mission, social good, or public pur-
pose.49 Nonprofits will therefore achieve particular success in “trust” industries, 
where those who interact with the firm must trust the firm to treat them fairly.50 
Consequently, entrepreneurs will organize firms more often as nonprofits in 
these industries,51 and nonprofits will persist in these industries over the long 
term because of their competitive advantage derived from their nondistribution 
constraint.52 
An example reinforces the point. Consider hospitals, an industry that fea-
tures a variety of ownership types.53 When the hospital is investor-owned, it 
has the incentive to maximize profits, focusing on profitable services,54 cutting 
costs,55 and inflating patient diagnostic codes for maximum reimbursement.56 
Physician-owned cooperative hospitals, while retaining investor-owned firms’ 
incentive to maximize profits, have the motivation to do so in a way that takes 
                                                                                                                           
47 See, e.g., Scott Baker & Albert H. Choi, Reputation and Litigation: Why Costly Legal Sanc-
tions Can Work Better Than Reputational Sanctions, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 45, 50 (2018); Peter Molk, 
The Ownership of Health Insurers, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 873, 881. 
48 Hansmann, supra note 26, at 859. 
49 See, e.g., John Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in REINIER KRAAKMAN 
ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 35, 43 n.30 (2d ed. 2009). 
50 Hansmann, supra note 26, at 845–68. 
51 Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Not-for-Profit Entrepreneurs, 81 J. PUB. ECON. 99, 102 
(2001) (modeling the nonprofit formation decision by profit-maximizing entrepreneurs). 
52 HANSMANN, supra note 38, at 22–23. 
53 The hospital industry is by no means the only market with multiple coexisting ownership 
forms. For in-depth treatment of ownership issues in the health insurance market, for example, see 
Molk, supra note 47, at 889. 
54 Jill R. Horwitz, Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 157 (2007). 
55 David M. Cutler & Jill R. Horwitz, Converting Hospitals from Not-for-Profit to For-Profit Sta-
tus: Why and What Effects?, in THE CHANGING HOSPITAL INDUSTRY: COMPARING NOT-FOR-PROFIT 
AND FOR-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS 45, 46–47 (David M. Cutler ed., 2000); Yu-Chu Shen, Changes in 
Hospital Performance After Ownership Conversions, 40 INQUIRY 217, 219 (2003). 
56 Elaine Silverman & Jonathan Skinner, Are For-Profit Hospitals Really Different? Medicare 
Upcoding and Market Structure 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 8133, 2001), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=260546 [https://perma.cc/32PH-A9N5]. 
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doctor-owners’ interests into account, focusing on doctor-friendly design and 
quality services.57 Government-owned facilities lose the profit incentive of 
investor- or physician-owned hospitals, and in exchange adopt a government-
imposed purpose, which more often is to provide specialized care for veterans 
or to serve as a medical provider of last resort to the poor.58 
Notice, however, that none of these organizations have much incentive to 
protect the interests of patients or the broader public beyond the minimum 
baseline needed to carry out a successful enterprise. Enter the nonprofit hospi-
tal. The nonprofit, with nobody entitled to accumulated earnings, and some-
times with no group entitled to appoint management, has no owners in the tra-
ditional sense. The nonprofit, therefore, does not have the incentive to priori-
tize one group over another. We would therefore expect the nonprofit to be the 
organization that strikes the delicate balance that considers all stakeholder in-
terests, not simply those of investor-owners or policyholder-owners.59 The 
nonprofit, for example, might be the firm we most expect to maximize the 
quality of medical services for its customers, doing so in a way that also incor-
porates the interests of physicians, employees, the general public, and the full 
variety of stakeholders.60 
As the example shows, nonprofits’ nondistribution constraint and con-
comitant lack of owners provide a measure of protection for nonowners and 
define the role of nonprofit enterprise. We next turn to a consideration of rele-
vant provisions from state and federal law that help define this essential role 
and the associated implications for nonprofit governance. 
                                                                                                                           
57 Maya A. Babu et al., Physician-Owned Hospitals, Neurosurgeons, and Disclosure: Lessons 
from Law and the Literature, 68 NEUROSURGERY 1724, 1725 (2011); Lawrence P. Casalino et al., 
Focused Factories? Physician-Owned Specialty Facilities, 22 HEALTH AFFS. 56, 56 (2003); Jeffrey 
Stensland & Ariel Winter, Do Physician-Owned Cardiac Hospitals Increase Utilization?, 25 HEALTH 
AFFS. 119, 127 (2006). Physician-owned facilities are a particular example of worker ownership, 
whose ownership structure is generally responsive to worker interests. For more on worker ownership, 
see Peter Molk, The Puzzling Lack of Cooperatives, 88 TUL. L. REV. 899, 918 (2014). 
58 Horwitz, supra note 54, at 158. The more that nonprofits compete with for-profits in 
healthcare, however, the more that nonprofits pursue a product differentiation strategy. See Jihwan 
Moon & Steven M. Shugan, Nonprofit Versus For-Profit Health Care Competition: How Service Mix 
Makes Nonprofit Hospitals More Profitable, 57 J. MKTG. RSCH. 193, 206 (2020). 
59 Molk, supra note 57, at 951. 
60 See generally Horwitz, supra note 54, at 171–75 (analyzing the profitability of services provid-
ed by various types of hospitals); Joseph P. Newhouse, Toward a Theory of Nonprofit Institutions: An 
Economic Model of a Hospital, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 64 (1970) (describing the economic efficiency of 
nonprofit hospitals). But see Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the Not-for-Profit 
Sector, 52 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (2009) (suggesting that nonprofits still may have motives to reduce con-
sumer welfare); Caitlin M. Durand, Note, Who Blesses This Merger? Antitrust’s Role in Maintaining 
Access to Reproductive Health Care in the Wake of Catholic Hospital Mergers, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2595, 
2637 (2020) (arguing that Catholic hospitals, many of which are nonprofits, reduce consumer welfare 
by eliminating access to reproductive health care services).  
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B. State Law 
Although it is true that many nonprofits file for preferential tax treatment 
under § 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, and that the potential for prefer-
ential tax treatment undoubtedly can be a strong inducement to organize as a 
nonprofit, nonprofits can and do exist with no corresponding § 501(c) status.61 
We therefore look first to the state organizational law of nonprofits, as all non-
profits need to incorporate, before turning to the additional federal tax rules 
that apply to the (sizable) subset of tax-preferenced nonprofits. 
The differentiating feature of nonprofit organizations, as a doctrinal mat-
ter, is their prohibition on distributing net profits to individuals. This prohibi-
tion is supplied by state law. States are remarkably harmonious in their re-
quirement that organizations formed under nonprofit corporation statutes are 
prohibited from “mak[ing] any distributions,” as enunciated in the Revised 
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act.62 
The nondistribution constraint is where nonprofit state statutes break most 
dramatically from the state law of other organizational forms. The rest of state 
nonprofit corporation law largely mirrors the law of general corporations.63 For 
example, just like traditional corporations, nonprofits can usually be formed 
for “any lawful activity,”64 have perpetual duration,65 and their management is 
subject to familiar corporate law fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and good 
faith.66 And, just as with traditional corporations, much of the rest of state non-
profit corporate law supplies default provisions, which the nonprofit is free to 
alter as it sees fit. 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See SALAMON, supra note 39, at 15 (estimating that 25% of nonprofits do not seek a federal tax 
exemption). 
62 See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 13.01–.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1987) (providing 
limited exceptions for restricted repurchase of memberships and for restricted distributions upon dis-
solution); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-11301 (2020) (adopting the Model Act’s approach); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.01(C) (West 2020) (stating that nonprofit earnings are “not distributa-
ble to[] its members, directors, officers, or other private persons, except [for] the payment of reasona-
ble compensation for services rendered”); WASH. REV. CODE § 24.03.005(16) (2020) (defining non-
profits as “a corporation no part of the income of which is distributable to its members, directors or 
officers”). 
63 See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 26, at 840. 
64 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 3.01; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-1035 (2020). 
Some state laws are more restrictive on this point. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/103.05 (2020) 
(authorizing nonprofit corporations in thirty-five categories); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 180, § 4 (2020) 
(providing a list of fourteen purposes for which nonprofit corporations may be formed). This approach 
was common historically. Note, Permissible Purposes for Nonprofit Corporations, 51 COLUM. L. 
REV. 889, 890 (1951). 
65 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 3.02; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 65.077 (2020). 
66 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30; see also FLA. STAT. § 617.0830 (2020). 
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There are three additional notable areas, however, in which nonprofit law 
breaks from traditional corporate law that are relevant for our analysis. The 
first is an absence of a requirement for election of managers by shareholders. 
For traditional corporations, shareholders’ election of directors is one of the 
few mandatory protections to which shareholders are entitled.67 Nonprofits, 
however, have no traditional owners, and by extension no shareholders. Instead, 
a nonprofit may specify that its management either is elected by the nonprofit’s 
membership base, or appointed by the nonprofit’s directors, or designated in 
whatever other manner the nonprofit’s charter or bylaws provide.68 
Another difference concerns external oversight of the nonprofit’s opera-
tions. Nonprofits, particularly those that are organized to provide a public ben-
efit, are answerable to state attorneys general. Attorneys general have concur-
rent oversight over matters ranging from voluntary69 or judicial70 dissolution, 
to assessing whether a nonprofit’s action is ultra vires,71 to removing direc-
tors,72 to approving conflicted transactions,73 to approving mergers,74 to ap-
proving a sale of all or substantially all assets.75 For corporations, shareholders 
police compliance with governance restrictions; for nonprofits, the attorney 
general is set up to be a key filler of this role. 
The final relevant difference pertains to the internal affairs doctrine. Un-
der traditional corporate law, matters related to disputes that are internal to the 
corporation are decided under the law of the state in which the corporation 
forms.76 Thus, issues involving disputes between the corporation and its direc-
tors, officers, and shareholders are decided under the laws of the incorporation 
state.77 Scholars have theorized the internal affairs doctrine as driving a robust 
competition among states to attract organizational formations, because it pro-
vides states with the control needed to develop an attractive suite of business 
laws.78 
                                                                                                                           
67 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2020); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.03 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2016). See generally Peter Molk, How Do LLC Owners Contract Around Default Statutory Protec-
tions?, 42 J. CORP. L. 503, 510 (2017) (discussing the mandatory rules of corporations). 
68 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.04. 
69 Id. § 14.03. 
70 Id. § 14.30. 
71 Id. § 3.04. 
72 Id. § 8.10. 
73 Id. § 8.31. 
74 Id. § 11.02. 
75 Id. § 12.02. 
76 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. b, g (AM. L. INST. 1971). 
77 Id. cmt. b, g; see, e.g., Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982). For a fuller history of 
the internal affairs doctrine and its relationship to choice of jurisdiction, in addition to choice of law, 
see Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract, 96 B.U. L. REV. 485, 500–04 (2016). 
78 Roberta Romano, in particular, has argued for how states’ control over the development of their 
respective business law enables states to attract companies by committing credibly to producing re-
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Despite being well-respected in the context of traditional corporations, the 
internal affairs doctrine receives a more mixed reception when applied to non-
profits. Some jurisdictions expressly recognize the doctrine in the nonprofit 
context.79 Other jurisdictions have not ruled one way or the other. Some states, 
however, refuse to recognize the internal affairs doctrine, and indeed have of-
fered interpretive guidance that expressly rejects the doctrine.80 For instance, 
California’s Attorney General, backed by the state’s courts,81 has claimed 
“oversight over foreign entities involved in the nonprofit sector in Califor-
nia”82 and has noted that “[e]ven though foreign nonprofit corporations have 
been formed and incorporated elsewhere, they may be subject to California 
corporate law enforced by the Attorney General.”83 And New York imposes on 
foreign nonprofit corporations a set of rules regarding member derivative ac-
tions, indemnification of directors and officers, and mergers or consolida-
tions.84 
                                                                                                                           
sponsive organizational law in the future. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPO-
RATE LAW 9 (1993); Roberta Romano, The Market for Corporate Law Redux, in 2 OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 358, 365 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017) [hereinafter Romano, Redux]; 
Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
225, 276–78 (1985). For a recent empirical assessment of this theory, see Peter Molk, Delaware’s 
Dominance and the Future of Organizational Law, 55 GA. L. REV 1111 (2021). 
79 See, e.g., Boomer Dev., LLC v. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders of the U.S., 258 F. Supp. 3d 1, 
23 (D.D.C. 2017); State ex rel. Petro v. Gold, 166 Ohio App. 3d 371, 2006-Ohio-943, 850 N.E.2d 
1218, at ¶¶ 45–47. 
80 Unfortunately, we are unsure of the precise number of states that depart from the internal af-
fairs doctrine for nonprofits. See, e.g., Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Attorney General Oversight of 
Charities 11 (Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit Orgs., Working Paper No. 41, 2007), https://cpl.hks.harvard.
edu/files/cpl/files/workingpaper_41.pdf?m=1440179611 [https://perma.cc/48V2-G4AR]; Antonia M. 
Grumbach, Whither Internal Affairs: State Regulation of the Internal Affairs of Foreign Not-for-Profit 
Corporations: An Exploratory Discussion 12–14 (Oct. 2005), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/
files/npf/Grumbach%20October%202005.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2ED-YH73]. 
81 See, e.g., Am. Ctr. for Educ., Inc. v. Cavnar, 145 Cal. Rptr. 736, 743 (Ct. App. 1978) (“Where 
a charity has been organized by California residents, is located in this state and has all of its assets and 
most of its activity here, we believe that actions taken in California concerning the administration of 
that charity should not escape the scrutiny of California law merely because the founders chose to 
incorporate elsewhere.”), superseded by statute, CAL. PROB. CODE § 24 (West 1991). 
82 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDE FOR CHARITIES 100 (2020), https://oag.ca.
gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/charities/publications/guide_for_charities.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ULC-
QZG9]. 
83 Id. at 102; see also Laws & Regulations, CAL. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., https://www.oag.ca.
gov/charities/laws [https://perma.cc/SC7L-ERTS] (click on the first FAQ) (explaining that Califor-
nia’s nonprofit law “applies to all foreign charitable corporations . . . doing business or holding prop-
erty in California for charitable purposes”). 
84 N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 1320 (McKinney 2020). 
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C. Federal Tax Law 
Although nonprofits are creatures of state law and are not required to seek 
preferential federal tax treatment, the majority do so.85 An organization that 
avails itself of these tax advantages also subjects itself to additional federal 
legal rules and oversight that are relevant for our following analysis. These 
federal requirements are principally aimed at preserving the tax base, ensuring 
that tax-exempt nonprofit assets do not migrate to private individuals.86 
Some federal requirements serve to strengthen rules that already exist un-
der state law.87 For instance, charitable organizations formed under § 501(c)(3) 
of the Internal Revenue Code are prohibited from allowing net earnings to in-
ure to the benefit of any private individual.88 This private inurement doctrine 
prevents private individuals from benefitting more than an incidental amount 
from an exempt nonprofit’s activities,89 reinforcing states’ nondistribution con-
straint.90 In addition, the IRS requires nonprofits to operate in accordance with 
their exempt purpose, placing limits on the extent to which the nonprofit can 
pursue operations beyond its organizational purposes, at the risk of losing its 
federal tax-exempt status.91 
The other notable feature of federal tax law is perhaps its most visible: a 
requirement that nonprofits make specific information required by Form 990 
or one of its derivatives available to the public.92 All nonprofits must make 
public filings that scale with the organization’s gross receipts; the most com-
prehensive disclosures, made via a Form 990, apply to organizations with an-
nual gross receipts of at least $200,000 or total assets of at least $500,000.93 
The IRS and some state regulators use the Form 990 for monitoring purposes, 
                                                                                                                           
85 SALAMON, supra note 39, at 24. 
86 See, e.g., Peter Swords, The Form 990 as an Accountability Tool for 501(c)(3) Nonprofits, 51 
TAX LAW. 571, 575 (1998). 
87 Although state oversight has been characterized as a broader mission to protect the public in-
terest, nonprofits that are exempt under federal law often receive favorable state tax treatment, giving 
states a similar interest in preserving the tax base. Peter Molk, Reforming Nonprofit Exemption Re-
quirements, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 475, 487 (2012); Swords, supra note 86, at 575. 
88 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2020). 
89 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987). 
90 See generally Hansmann, supra note 26, at 874 n.107 (noting how this prohibition mimics 
states’ nondistribution requirement). 
91 See, e.g., Molk, supra note 87, at 489–93. 
92 See I.R.S. Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047) 
(2020), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf [https://perma.cc/BR39-LZ7M] [hereinafter I.R.S. 
Form 990]. 
93 Form 990-EZ must be completed by organizations with annual gross receipts between $50,000 
and $200,000 and total assets of under $500,000, and Form 990-N is to be completed by organizations 
with annual gross receipts under $50,000. Form 990 Series Which Forms Do Exempt Organizations 
File Filing Phase In, IRS (July 14, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/form-990-series-
which-forms-do-exempt-organizations-file-filing-phase-in [https://perma.cc/38RT-3H4S]. 
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and it also serves as a way for the nonprofit to convey information about its pur-
pose and operations to the general public in a standardized manner.94 Various 
third-party organizations process this information into formats that may be more 
easily digestible by the public when deciding which organizations to patronize.95 
The Form 990 currently stands at twelve pages and includes a series of 
questions soliciting descriptive, numerical, and yes/no answers to questions 
along three main dimensions: (1) information the IRS uses to apply the tax 
code; (2) information about the nonprofit’s programs and activities; and (3) 
disclosures about the nonprofit’s internal governance and management, includ-
ing financial disclosures and information about governance practices and at-
tributes.96 We develop in more detail the content of these disclosures, and the 
areas where additional detail would be useful, in the next two Parts. 
II. ASSESSING GOVERNANCE MONITORS 
Now that we understand what a nonprofit organization is as a legal matter, 
and the role these organizations are intended to fill, in Section A of this Part we 
develop the central corporate law agency problem, in which a company’s man-
agement pursues its own self-interest instead of the company’s interest, and dis-
cuss the legal duties designed to mitigate this problem.97 In Section B, we then 
arrive at the central problem of nonprofit governance that serves as the basis for 
the rest of this Article: the lack of parties with vested interests to police these 
duties. We survey traditional and non-traditional potential enforcement agents, 
showing their current failures under existing nonprofit incentive frameworks,98 
before turning to proposals for solutions in the next Part.99 
                                                                                                                           
94 See, e.g., I.R.S., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990 RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM IN-
COME TAX 2 (2020), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZWT3-BKLQ] [here-
inafter INSTRUCTIONS FOR I.R.S. FORM 990]; Swords, supra note 86, at 577–80. 
95 See, e.g., Our Story, CANDID, https://candid.org/about/our-story [https://perma.cc/S6YB-TETQ] 
(“Every year, millions of nonprofits spend trillions of dollars around the world. We find out where 
that money comes from, where it goes, and why it matters.”); Overview, CHARITY NAVIGATOR, 
https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=628 [https://perma.cc/KA69-
8VP5] (“[T]he nation’s largest and most-utilized evaluator of charities.”). 
96 I.R.S. Form 990, supra note 92; Swords, supra note 86, at 605. 
 97 See infra notes 100–114 and accompanying text. 
98 Of course, this is not to suggest a blanket refusal by nonprofits to comply with the law. Theory 
and empirical evidence suggest that many nonprofits will comply with the law for a variety of reasons. 
See, e.g., Brian Galle, Why Do Foundations Follow the Law? Evidence from Adoption of the Uniform 
Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, 36 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 532, 551 (2017). 
 99 See infra notes 115–223 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Agency Cost Problem 
A fundamental problem for traditional corporations is the problem of 
agency costs.100 The basis for agency cost theory is a misalignment of incen-
tives between a principal and his or her agent. Within for-profits, the share-
holders are typically viewed as principals with management serving as their 
agents. The separation of management from control gives rise to agency costs, 
as the interests of the shareholder principals diverge from the implementation 
of those desires by the agent (the firm’s management).101 
Although nonprofits have no shareholders, they do still have agency 
costs, due to breakdowns between what is best for the principal (here, the non-
profit firm) and its agent management. Theoretical and empirical work validate 
this point.102 Indeed, the case for agency cost problems can be stronger for 
nonprofits because nonprofit management can have soft targets for perfor-
mance that make detecting agency costs more difficult.103 
Because of agency costs, managers may enrich themselves at the expense 
of the firm or shirk in their managerial efforts. Managers may invest firm re-
sources in ways that maximize the returns of the manager, instead of those of 
the firm, such as by having a nicer office104 or by undertaking an acquisition 
for purposes of empire building value.105 Shirking may lead the manager to 
make certain errors in judgment that a manager whose incentives are better 
aligned with those of the firm might avoid. 
Legal fiduciary duties are designed to address this problem. As we noted 
in the prior Part, management of for-profits and nonprofits have the same basic 
duties: a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. The duty of care requires manage-
ment to exercise reasonable care in carrying out their management responsibil-
ities. The duty is relatively easy to satisfy, with the board typically being re-
                                                                                                                           
100 Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, The Agency Cost Paradigm: The Good, the Bad, and the 
Ugly, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 561, 562 (2015); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, 
Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986). This is true in nonprofits. 
See Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1267 (2011). 
101 Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency 
Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 232 (2008); Jensen & Meckling, 
supra note 28, at 308. 
102 John E. Core et al., Agency Problems of Excess Endowment Holdings in Not-for-Profit Firms, 
41 J. ACCT. & ECON. 307, 309–10 (2006); Galle & Walker, supra note 26, at 1882; Henry B. Hans-
mann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 507 (1981). 
103 Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law, and Ethics of Not-
for-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345, 1410–11 (2003). 
104 James S. Ang et al., Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 55 J. FIN. 81, 86 (2000). 
105 Jarrad Harford et al., The Sources of Value Destruction in Acquisitions by Entrenched Manag-
ers, 106 J. FIN. ECON. 247, 248 (2012); Wei Shi et al., Independent Director Death and CEO Acquisi-
tiveness: Build an Empire or Pursue a Quiet Life?, 38 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 780, 780 (2017). 
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quired to show only basic non-reckless conduct in its decision-making.106 Del-
aware law also provides for exculpation for such claims and a shield from di-
rectors’ personal financial liability, if the board exercised its business judg-
ment107 and was informed in its decision-making.108 Given the low bar, cases 
that find liability are rare under Delaware law. Nonprofit duty-of-care cases are 
equally rare.109 
The duty of loyalty is designed to reduce management’s incentive to pur-
sue its self-interest at the company’s expense, requiring corporate management 
to act in the company’s interest.110 The duty of loyalty focuses on oversight 
duties as well as self-dealing, such as usurping corporate opportunities and 
engaging in conflicted, interested transactions.111 These duties exist in both 
for-profit and nonprofit organizations and operate similarly.112 Unlike the duty 
of care, the duty of loyalty cannot be completely waived or exculpated, and the 
hurdle on management to satisfy this duty is significantly higher.113 
In the for-profit context, these duties combine to empower corporate 
boards and shareholders to check meaningful amounts of poor governance, and 
though the check is imperfect, it is effective across a variety of circumstanc-
es.114 Although the legal duties carry over to the nonprofit context, the effec-
tiveness of boards, shareholders, and outside monitors in enforcing those du-
ties does not. We examine this failure in the next Section, which assesses the 
suite of potential nonprofit monitors. 
                                                                                                                           
106 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
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108 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 864 (Del. 1985) (en banc). 
109 See, e.g., Vacco v. Diamandopoulos, 715 N.Y.S.2d 269, 271–73 (Sup. Ct. 1998). 
110 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a). 
111 Id. 
112 See, e.g., Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate Govern-
ance Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 701, 713 (2008) 
(“State law nonprofit corporate board governance responsibilities are essentially the same as those that 
apply to the for-profit corporate director.”). 
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ty. Peter Molk, Uncorporate Insider Trading, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1693, 1710–17 (2020). 
114 See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV. 
603, 639 (2018); Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws, 106 
CALIF. L. REV. 373, 376 (2018). Fiduciary duties are effective not only by operating on management 
directly, but also by empowering corporate counsel to advise management on abiding by fiduciary 
duties. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, Fiduciary Principles in Legal Representation, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 263, 272 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019). 
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B. Evaluating Existing Nonprofit Monitors 
1. The Nonprofit Itself 
The most obvious place to start is with the organization itself. Corporate 
directors are charged with overseeing the company, with legal duties that rein-
force this obligation. Fiduciary duties of care and loyalty require directors to 
act with the skill of a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances, and in a 
manner the directors reasonably believe to be in the corporation’s best interest, 
respectively.115 Courts extend familiar corporate law fiduciary duties of care 
and loyalty to nonprofits,116 whose board responsibilities effectively mimic 
those of traditional corporations.117 We might therefore expect diligent non-
profit board members to provide one meaningful check on agency costs. 
There are problems with this story, however. One potential issue comes 
from, in most states, the absence of a requirement that nonprofit directors be 
disinterested. Interested transactions—in which a director stands to profit from 
a nonprofit’s action—are an area that is potentially ripe for abuse in the non-
profit space.118 Several high-profile examples have made the point.119 Adelphi 
University, for instance, replaced eighteen of its trustees after it was discovered 
that firms owned by some of those trustees earned undisclosed, significant in-
come from business with Adelphi.120 Two trustees of the $10 billion Bishop 
Estate charity were indicted for steering business to a real-estate developer in 
                                                                                                                           
115 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a), (b).  
116 See, e.g., Bittinger v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 123 F.3d 877, 888 (6th Cir. 1997) (Ryan, J., dis-
senting); Rockwell v. Trs. of the Berkshire Museum, No. 1776CV00253, 2017 WL 6940932, at *10 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2017), aff’d sub. nom. Hatt v. McGraw, 111 N.E.3d 1111 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2018); Commonwealth v. New Founds., Inc., 182 A.3d 1059, 1066 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018); 
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117 Bishop, supra note 112, at 713. 
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lected in NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE CHARITY OFFS., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE CHARITIES 
OFFICIALS (NASCO) ANNUAL REPORT ON STATE ENFORCEMENT AND REGULATION: JANUARY 
2019–MARCH 2020, at 7–10 (2020), https://www.nasconet.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/NASCO-
Annual-Report-Jan-2019-March-2020-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8KS-224K]; Marion R. Fremont-
Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing by Officers and Directors of Charities: A Survey of Press Re-
ports 1995–2002, at 4 (Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit Orgs., Working Paper No. 20, 2003), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=451240 [https://perma.cc/SP6K-RBGM]. 
120 Bruce Lambert, New York Regents Oust 18 Trustees from Adelphi U., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 
1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/11/nyregion/new-york-regents-oust-18-trustees-from-
adelphi-u.html [https://perma.cc/BP8Z-Q3G5]. See generally LIONEL S. LEWIS, WHEN POWER COR-
RUPTS: ACADEMIC GOVERNING BOARDS IN THE SHADOW OF THE ADELPHI CASE (2000) (document-
ing the circumstances that led to the replacement of eighteen of Adelphi’s nineteen trustees). 
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exchange for payments totaling $100,000.121 Directors of the University of 
Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, formerly the largest public hospital 
system in the United States and now part of Rutgers University, obtained jobs 
for family and friends and engaged in other self-interested transactions, ulti-
mately resulting in a deferred criminal prosecution agreement and the ap-
pointment of a federal monitor.122 Conflicted transactions on a smaller scale 
are the norm; a recent survey found that twenty-one percent of nonprofits re-
ported buying or renting goods, services, or property from a board member or 
affiliated company during the prior two years, with the number being even 
higher among larger nonprofits.123 
In the traditional corporate space, stock exchange requirements for inde-
pendent directors ensure that a majority of the board has financial independ-
ence to evaluate the company’s operations critically.124 This dispassionate as-
sessment serves as a valuable monitoring function. Nonprofits have no stock, 
however, and do not list on exchanges.125 Independence requirements must 
therefore come from state statutes and, according to a recent survey, only five 
states had such a requirement.126 
Of course, nonprofits can employ independent directors without a statuto-
ry mandate to that effect. Nonprofit advisors recommend independent directors 
as a matter of best practices, and anecdotal surveys suggest many nonprofits 
appear to follow the recommendation.127 
                                                                                                                           
121 Paul M. Barrett, At Bishop Estate, Scandal Widens as Powerhouse’s Chair Is Indicted, WALL 
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ance?, 75 TENN. L. REV. 83, 90–98 (2007). 
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previous two years). 
 124 Boozang, supra note 122, at 131. 
125 See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (describing the lack of traditional shareholders 
within nonprofit corporations). 
126 See Marion R. Fremont-Smith, The Search for Greater Accountability of Nonprofit Organiza-
tions: Recent Legal Developments and Proposals for Change, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 609, 614 (2007) 
(listing five states with some measure of an independent director requirement). 
127 ABA COORDINATING COMM. ON NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE, GUIDE TO NONPROFIT CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE IN THE WAKE OF SARBANES-OXLEY 2 (2005) [hereinafter ABA GUIDE]; Her-
rington J. Bryce, Nonprofit Board Responsibilities: The Basics, NONPROFIT Q. (Aug. 21, 2017), 
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/nonprofit-board-governance-responsibilities-basic-guide/ [https://perma.
cc/W47R-C28J]. 
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We use comprehensive nonprofit filing data to verify the point. Using 
nonprofit data filed in IRS Forms 990, we can examine the prevalence of inde-
pendent director usage. The Form asks nonprofits to, among other things, pro-
vide the number of total voting directors as well as the number of independent 
directors. The Form defines a director as independent if the director: (1) is not 
compensated as an employee by the nonprofit or a related organization; (2) is 
compensated under ten thousand dollars as an independent contractor by the 
nonprofit or related organizations, other than reasonable compensation for direc-
torial services; and (3), along with the director’s family members, is not involved 
in interested transactions with the nonprofit or related organizations.128 
We examined all 1.7 million Forms 990 (required to be filed by larger tax-
exempt nonprofits) filed from 2010 through 2018 by nonprofits reporting at 
least one voting director to determine systematically the extent of nonprofit 
director independence in practice.129 The results are summarized in Table 1. As 
we can see, despite lacking a statutory mandate, nonprofits show a remarkable, 
stable appetite for independent directors. A full 71% of nonprofits have, under 
the Form 990 definition of independence, a completely independent board, and 
90% of nonprofits have at least one independent director. In theory, then, non-
profit boards should be in an admirable position to reduce agency costs due to 
self-interested behavior by a subset of directors. 
Table 1 
Degree of Board Independence 
at least one 
member at least 25% at least 51% at least 75%
fully 
independent
2018 90% 89% 87% 84% 72%
2017 90% 89% 87% 84% 72%
2016 90% 89% 87% 84% 72%
2015 90% 89% 87% 84% 71%
2014 90% 89% 87% 83% 71%
2013 90% 89% 87% 83% 71%
2012 89% 89% 87% 83% 70%
2011 88% 87% 85% 82% 70%
2010 89% 88% 86% 82% 68%
Overall 90% 89% 87% 83% 71%  
We also can examine the prevalence of conflict-of-interest policies, which 
help formally address duty of loyalty issues, among nonprofits. Form 990 re-
                                                                                                                           
128 INSTRUCTIONS FOR I.R.S. FORM 990, supra note 94, at 20. 
129 The IRS makes Forms 990 available electronically at https://registry.opendata.aws/irs990/ 
[https://perma.cc/TGG2-DRMM]. Much of the data has been helpfully extracted and aggregated by 
Professor Jesse Lecy, who has made the data available to interested researchers. Projects, JESSE D. 
LECY, http://www.lecy.info/projects [https://perma.cc/2JKN-JSWG]. 
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quires nonprofits to disclose whether they have a written conflict of interest 
policy, and if so, whether management was required to disclose interests that 
could give rise to conflicts and whether the nonprofit monitored and enforced 
compliance with its conflict-of-interest policy.130 We summarize the prevalence 
of these policies in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Board Conflict of Interest Policies 












2018 62% 57% 54% 39% 34% 31%
2017 63% 58% 55% 40% 35% 32%
2016 63% 58% 55% 40% 35% 32%
2015 63% 58% 54% 40% 35% 32%
2014 63% 57% 54% 40% 35% 32%
2013 63% 57% 54% 40% 35% 32%
2012 64% 57% 54% 40% 35% 32%
2011 59% 53% 49% 36% 30% 27%
2010 64% 58% 55% 42% 36% 33%
Overall 63% 57% 54% 40% 35% 32%
Nonprofits with only minority of board 
independentAll nonprofits
 
Unfortunately, it appears that nonprofits’ appetite for formal conflict of 
interest policies is considerably lower than their appetite for independent direc-
tors. Although 90% of nonprofits have a majority disinterested board, 63% of 
nonprofits have a conflict-of-interest policy, 57% require disclosure of con-
flicts, and only 54% actually monitor and enforce their policies. 
The picture is grimmer among nonprofits with a minority independent 
board, which are the nonprofits about which we might be most worried. 
Among these organizations, only 40% have a written conflict of interest policy, 
35% require conflicts to be disclosed, and 32% actually monitor and enforce 
their conflict policies. 
Therefore, although nonprofit boards report admirable levels of inde-
pendence, for many nonprofits those board members are under no obligation to 
disclose conflicts, the nonprofit itself has no disclosure policy, or the nonprofit 
publicly reports failing to police its own policy.131 Even for nonprofits with a 
                                                                                                                           
130 I.R.S. Form 990, supra note 92, at 6, pt. VI, items 12a–c. 
131 Principles of corporate law nevertheless will provide some support in these instances, because 
safe harbors for conflicted transactions will apply only if a majority of independent directors, meas-
ured with respect to a particular transaction, approve the transaction. Andrew F. Tuch, Reassessing 
Self-dealing: Between No Conflict and Fairness, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 939, 951 (2019). Assuming the 
transaction is challenged—an assumption we confront shortly—a court’s scrutiny into whether a con-
flicted transaction was nevertheless approved by disinterested directors, or was entirely fair, supplies a 
valuable safeguard against breaches of the duty of loyalty by the board. 
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majority of independent board members, then, there is reason to question the 
board’s capability to manage agency costs. 
Yet a significant portion of nonprofits not only have independent boards, 
but also report having conflict of interest policies that are enforced by the or-
ganization. Can these nonprofit boards be trusted? Not necessarily. Independ-
ence is but one desirable attribute for a responsible steward; directors must 
also have good business sense and an understanding of their monitoring role to 
be trusted with overseeing an organization. Unfortunately, this is an area of 
clear difference between directors of traditional and nonprofit corporations.132 
Doubtless, many nonprofits have directors with the necessary business 
knowledge to detect managerial self-interest issues, and traditional corpora-
tions do not have an unblemished track record.133 For many other nonprofits, 
however, a key attribute of a successful director is not their business acumen, 
but rather their willingness to donate to the organization or their ability to line 
up other successful donors.134 Other nonprofits hire directors because of the 
directors’ close ties to the nonprofit’s mission, as with a private family founda-
tion whose directors must be comprised of family members.135 
Undoubtedly, many directors serve in their capacity because of a strong 
identity with the nonprofit’s mission. This enthusiasm can provide a powerful 
and desirable non-pecuniary motivator for the director to expend effort beyond 
what we might expect from their analogous for-profit counterparts.136 Yet en-
thusiasm for the nonprofit’s mission provides little help if the director lacks the 
basic knowledge to identify and correct governance failures. 
                                                                                                                           
132 See, e.g., James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda 
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TROWER, supra note 123, at 17 (“[N]onprofits use large boards as a fundraising tool . . . .”). 
135 ABA GUIDE, supra note 127, at 22. 
136 Indeed, many nonprofit directors receive no financial compensation for their duties. 
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Moreover, other characteristics that make for-profit boards effective mon-
itors also fail to carry over to the nonprofit context. A key component of the 
duty of loyalty applicable to corporate boards is the duty of oversight. En-
shrined in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, the over-
sight duty requires members of the board of directors to assure: 
[T]hat information and reporting systems exist in the organization 
that are reasonably designed to provide to senior management and to 
the board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow man-
agement and the board, each within its scope, to reach informed 
judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law 
and its business performance.137 
The Delaware Supreme Court clarified this duty in Stone v. Ritter, in 
which, quoting Caremark, it emphasized that: 
Generally where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss is 
predicated upon ignorance of liability creating activities within the 
corporation . . . only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to 
exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a 
reasonable information and reporting system exists—will establish 
the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.138 
Though three recent cases challenging the oversight duty raised eyebrows by 
making it past a motion to dismiss,139 no case has fundamentally altered this 
oversight duty. 
In addition, in traditional firms, better monitoring includes an understand-
ing by the board of the key risks that may impact a company. Oftentimes, such 
risk analysis is undertaken through a risk assessment committee of the 
board.140 Increasingly, boards are concerned with compliance across a range of 
issues. For-profit boards have made compliance more central in recent years 
due to anti-bribery, audit, and data-protection-related risks.141 In doing so, 
boards provide oversight to ensure that their firms have implemented a credi-
ble compliance program to both identify and manage risks. The compliance 
                                                                                                                           
137 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
138 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (en banc) (quoting Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971). 
139 Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 808 (Del. 2019) (en banc); Hughes v. Hu, C.A. No. 
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 141 See Ravi Venkatesan & Leslie Benton, How Companies Can Take a Stand Against Bribery, 
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function also includes creating appropriate compliance reporting systems and 
controls, and testing these controls to ensure that they function properly.142 
Recent guidance from the Department of Justice on the “Evaluation of Corpo-
rate Compliance Programs,”143 the International Organization for Standardiza-
tion (ISO) standards for compliance management systems through ISO 
37301,144 and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,145 incentivize boards of tradi-
tional corporations to take their monitoring duties seriously. Although the same 
legal duties extend to nonprofits as well,146 as evidenced by the United Way 
example that opened this Article, the duty often goes unpoliced by the firm.147 
Publicly traded for-profit companies have even greater systems in place, 
such as periodic and yearly disclosure requirements that produce a snapshot of 
the firm and the risk that it faces. As part of good governance, boards of direc-
tors assess the veracity and adequacy of the company’s disclosures. Further, 
section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains a CEO and CFO certification 
requirement to certify that disclosures are accurate and complete.148 A yearly 
audit provides an accounting mechanism to review the financial health of a 
firm to ensure that the stated performance of the firm matches up to its actual 
performance based on the internal numbers generated by management.149 Alt-
hough auditors have not always been infallible gatekeepers for corporate gov-
ernance,150 they can be effective.151 
Audit committees among publicly traded companies play a particularly 
important role in this regard by ensuring that any deficiencies in financial and 
                                                                                                                           
 142 See Michael Ramos, Evaluate the Control Environment, J. ACCT. (May 1, 2004), https://www.
journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2004/may/evaluatethecontrolenvironment.html [https://perma.cc/
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143 FRAUD SECTION, CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLI-
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ORGS. 374, 382 (2014). 
148 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a). 
149 See All About Auditors: What Investors Need to Know, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 24, 
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151 Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1592 (2010). 
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audit matters are promptly addressed to the entire board and to regulators.152 
The audit committee also analyzes the information given to it by its outside 
auditors. The SEC requires that all members of the audit committee be inde-
pendent and not receive consulting or advisory fees (beyond director compen-
sation) from the company or its subsidiaries.153 But, as noted before, nonprofits 
are not publicly traded and are not subject to these requirements. 
2. The State Attorneys General 
If the nonprofit itself does not provide an adequate mitigator of agency 
costs, perhaps an external entity, like state attorneys general, might. State at-
torneys general are tasked under state organizational law with oversight of the 
nonprofits that do business in their state, with the goal of making sure those 
nonprofits are serving the missions for which they were established.154 Robust 
monitoring by these state attorneys general could spell the answer to nonprofit 
governance issues. 
In practice, however, state attorneys general have proven poor at this 
component of their jobs. Some of the explanation lies in the meager resources 
that state attorneys general devote to nonprofit oversight. Most attorney gen-
eral offices have no meaningful staff devoted to overseeing nonprofits. Recent 
studies report that over half the states have attorney general offices with only 
three or fewer full-time equivalent staff overseeing all the nonprofits in their 
state; a third of states have fewer than one.155 Three-quarters of states have one 
or fewer full-time equivalent attorneys dedicated to nonprofit oversight.156 
Even if staffed, attorneys general offices often lack the kind of information 
about nonprofit operations that would facilitate monitoring of nonprofit man-
agement; only eight states require nonprofits to register and file financial re-
ports with attorneys general offices,157 and many states have no registration 
                                                                                                                           
 152 Audit Committee Role & Responsibilities, CFA INST., https://www.cfainstitute.org/en/advocacy/
issues/audit-committee-role-practices#:~:text=The%20primary%20purpose%20of%20a,compliance%
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153 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (identifying the rules for 
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154 See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text. 
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requirements at all.158 The consensus, therefore, has long been that state attor-
neys general in practice serve as poor monitors.159 
This protracted failure has seemingly surprised commentators. Yet, we 
think that it may not be surprising to see few resources devoted to oversight by 
state attorneys general. Oversight reflects a classic commons problem. Each 
attorney general in every state in which a nonprofit does meaningful business 
generally has the authority to police that nonprofit’s behavior.160 Attorneys 
general, however, are typically tasked with protecting the public interest of 
only those citizens within their state.161 The rational attorney general, there-
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the potential value of monitoring); Swords, supra note 86, at 578 (“[I]t is clear that neither the [IRS] 
nor any state charities office have sufficient staff to adequately review these [Form 990] filings.”). 
160 See, e.g., supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text; see also N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. 
LAW § 1303 (McKinney 2020) (providing the attorney general with the power to bring an action 
against out-of-state corporations that do business within the state); BECERRA, supra note 82, at 100 
(“The Attorney General has oversight over foreign entities involved in the nonprofit sector in Califor-
nia.”); State Filing Requirements for Nonprofits, NAT’L COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS, https://www.
councilofnonprofits.org/tools-resources/state-filing-requirements-nonprofits [https://perma.cc/9KVH-
CE34]. 
161 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 5.01 (AM. 
L. INST. Tentative Draft No. 2, 2017) (“The state attorney general: (a) has the authority to protect 
charitable assets and interests within the jurisdiction of the state and to seek judicial relief to protect 
the public interest in those assets and interests . . . .”); Charities, N.M. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., 
https://www.nmag.gov/charities.aspx [https://perma.cc/AW5M-5WAU] (“The Office of the Attorney 
General has the duty to protect the interests of all beneficiaries of charities within its jurisdiction.”). 
This requirement is reinforced by the practical issues of attorneys general overwhelmingly being sub-
ject to election by voters within their state. See Attorneys General, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., 
https://www.naag.org/attorneys-general [https://perma.cc/87FR-AT5B] (noting that the attorney gen-
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fore, cares about a nonprofit’s indiscretions only to the extent those indiscre-
tions affect citizens within her state. This gives the attorney general an incom-
plete incentive to police any of the larger nonprofits whose activities extend 
outside her state’s borders. The benefits from costly monitoring will accrue 
partially to citizens to whom she is not answerable, while the costs are borne 
entirely by her office. For nonprofits of any meaningful size whose fundraising 
or operations cross state borders, then, the attorney general will rationally de-
vote comparatively less effort to oversight than the problem deserves.162 
Consequently, commentators have found that the comparatively rare sit-
uations in which attorneys general act either drastically under-reflect the over-
all problem of nonprofit mismanagement,163 or else are motivated by political 
payoffs among local constituents.164 The Pennsylvania Attorney General’s in-
tervention in the Milton Hershey School Trust’s (Trust) attempted divestment 
of its Hershey Company stake is illustrative of this latter phenomenon. The 
Trust, with its $17 billion endowment, funds the Milton Hershey School, a 
cost-free school for children from lower-income families.165 In 2002, the Trust 
announced a plan to divest its controlling stake in the Hershey company to di-
versify its holdings, prompting an abnormal increase in the value of Hershey 
                                                                                                                           
eral is elected in forty-three states). To the extent the attorney general has political ambitions involv-
ing other elected offices, the focus on domestic citizens is reinforced. Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? 
Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 946 (2004) (“Po-
litical cynics believe that ‘A.G.’ stands not for ‘attorney general’ but for ‘aspiring governor.’”). 
162 This is, of course, a problem for various enforcement efforts brought by attorneys general out-
side the nonprofit space as well, which can be alleviated by coordination among attorneys general 
across states—a solution we raise later. See, e.g., Jim Estes, Opinion, How the Big Tobacco Deal Went 
Bad, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/07/opinion/how-the-big-tobacco-
deal-went-bad.html [https://perma.cc/JBY9-SSEM]. Yet these coordination efforts are often unsuc-
cessful. See, e.g., Swords, supra note 86, at 577–78 & n.19 (describing efforts to coordinate nonprofit 
registration requirements, which have endured since at least 1993); Jennifer Chandler, Multi-state 
Registration = Multiple States of Confusion, NAT’L COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS (Apr. 11, 2018), https://
www.councilofnonprofits.org/thought-leadership/multi-state-registration-multiple-states-of-confusion 
[https://perma.cc/F2MG-XR5S] (describing continuing efforts to achieve coordination, apparently still 
without success). 
163 See, e.g., Gary, supra note 159, at 623 (“The worst abuses receive attention, but many prob-
lems probably go undetected or unaddressed.”); Jenkins, supra note 156, at 1131. 
164 See Brody, supra note 161, at 947–48 (“The incentives of this nearly universally elective of-
fice impel the incumbent to ignore cases that are politically dangerous and to jump into matters that 
are politically irresistible but implicate only ‘business’ decisions of charity managers.” (footnote omit-
ted)); Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 26, at 817 (“[T]he underlying structural problem [is] that the attor-
ney general is typically a political officer whose ambition toward higher office provides either little 
incentive to supervise charitable trusts or . . . perverse incentives to impose local political prefer-
ences.”). 
165 About Milton Hershey School, MILTON HERSHEY SCH., https://www.mhskids.org/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/6HYZ-NZM4]; see Milton Hershey Sch. & Sch. Tr. Form 990, Return of Organiza-
tion Exempt from Income Tax 1 (2018) (showing $17.4 billion in net assets at end of fiscal period). 
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stock of twenty-five percent.166 The Pennsylvania Attorney General, who was 
running for governor at the time, intervened and obtained a preliminary injunc-
tion of the sale, on the grounds that the sale would harm the local Pennsylvania 
economy and community.167 The Trust abandoned the sale soon after, and the 
stock price of Hershey tumbled twelve percent.168 A study by Jonathan Klick 
and Robert Sitkoff estimated the Attorney General’s actions sacrificed $2.7 
billion in Hershey shareholder wealth, $850 million in foregone assets to the 
Trust, and forced the Trust to maintain an undesirably undiversified investment 
position169—country-wide costs that exceeded any plausible measure of bene-
fits to the local Pennsylvania economy.170 But because the attorney general’s 
job is to protect the local state constituency’s interest, the rational action is to 
focus on the local costs while ignoring any effects that spill over into other 
states, making the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s actions not surprising giv-
en this more myopic cost-benefit analysis. In their current manifestation, then, 
state attorneys general provide a poor deterrent to nonprofit agency costs. 
3. The IRS 
If not the state attorneys general, then perhaps the other public agency 
charged with nonprofit oversight—the IRS—can provide the desired monitor-
ing. Two comparative advantages are immediately apparent. First, the IRS di-
rectly receives useful disclosures about larger exempt nonprofit operations 
through the yearly Forms 990 that nonprofits must file.171 Many state attorneys 
general, on the other hand, receive no disclosures at all,172 and Forms 990 are 
not made available to the public until twelve to eighteen months after they are 
filed.173 Second, the IRS, as a federal agency with nationwide interests, should 
internalize the effects of a nonprofit’s activities that spread beyond state lines. 
Unlike state attorneys general whose interests are confined within state bor-
                                                                                                                           
166 Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 26, at 755. 
167 Id. at 755–56. 
168 Id. at 756. 
169 Id. at 756–59. 
170 The Attorney General also lost his election campaign. Emily Sanders, Fisher Concedes to 
Rendell After Receiving 45 Percent of the Vote, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN (Nov. 6, 2002), https://www.
thedp.com/article/2002/11/fisher_concedes_to_rendell_after_receiving_45_percent_of_the_vote 
[https://perma.cc/52A3-D5TT]. 
171 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
172 MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND 
STATE LAW AND REGULATION 315–17, app. at 476 tbl.1 (2004) (listing disclosure requirements by 
state). 
173 How Long Does It Take for Forms 990 to Appear on Candid’s Website?, CANDID, https://
learning.candid.org/resources/knowledge-base/lag-time/ [https://perma.cc/PKR7-AUBF]. 
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ders, the IRS will have a stronger incentive to monitor nonprofits with wide-
spread activities.174 
Nevertheless, there are both theoretical and practical concerns with rely-
ing on the IRS as a monitor. Theoretically, although the state attorneys general 
are charged with protecting the general public interest, the IRS’s interest is nar-
rower, focusing only on ensuring that assets with preferential tax treatment are 
not funneled into private, non-preferenced uses.175 The sizable number of non-
profits without a tax exemption or preferential tax treatment therefore escape 
IRS oversight.176 So too do general governance issues that do not raise issues 
about misappropriation of funds, such as allegations of general managerial in-
competence or a failure to pursue one’s charitable mission with sufficient dili-
gence.177 
Practically, observers have noted chronic understaffing at the IRS relative 
to the scope of its responsibilities.178 This understaffing carries over to its ex-
empt organization oversight division,179 where it has been estimated that it 
would take seventy-nine years to audit all currently existing nonprofits.180 It 
would require a significant increase in resources for the IRS to be an effective 
                                                                                                                           
174 Cf. supra notes 160–162 and accompanying text. 
175 See Swords, supra note 86, at 575–76 (describing the IRS’s interest as “largely focused on 
whether any of an organization’s assets are being improperly diverted from charitable uses into pri-
vate, personal hands,” while noting that “[s]tate charities offices generally are charged with protecting 
the public’s interest in charities”). 
176 See supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting that approximately one quarter of nonprofits 
do not possess a tax exemption). 
177 A broad conception of the IRS’s interest in tax-exempt spending could be read to include gen-
eral governance issues at exempt nonprofits, because those issues result in a failure to maximize the 
efficiency of tax-advantaged dollars. Cf. Swords, supra note 86, at 575 n.14 (citing the argument from 
former Assistant Commissioner of the IRS Office of Exempt Plans/Exempt Organizations, justifying a 
broader mission in 1997). The IRS’s interest, however, is generally not construed this broadly, and 
with existing strains on IRS resources, we suspect little to change in the future. Id. at 575. 
178 See, e.g., Jory Heckman, Watchdog Finds IRS ‘Underfunded, Understaffed and at the Mercy 
of Shutdowns,’ FED. NEWS NETWORK (Feb. 13, 2019), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/government-
shutdown/2019/02/watchdog-finds-irs-underfunded-understaffed-and-at-the-mercy-of-shutdowns/ 
[https://perma.cc/9DG6-T25X]; Paul Kiel & Jesse Eisinger, How the IRS Was Gutted, PROPUBLICA 
(Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-irs-was-gutted [https://perma.cc/T8DP-
RBQY]. 
179 See, e.g., Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, “The Better Part of Valour Is Discretion”: Should the IRS 
Change or Surrender Its Oversight of Tax-Exempt Organizations?, 7 COLUM. J. TAX L. 80, 97–101 
(2016). 
180 JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 9 (2d 
ed. 2006). See generally id. (noting that most applications for tax exemption are greeted by a rubber-
stamp approval); Heath C. DeJean, Comment, High-Stakes Word Search: Ensuring Fair and Effective 
IRS Centralization in Tax Exemption, 75 LA. L. REV. 259, 266–68 (2014) (describing the “triage” 
process for processing exemption applications). 
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monitor,181 and with the current IRS prioritization of its other responsibili-
ties,182 this seems unlikely.183 
4. Other Nonprofits 
Having considered public agencies, we now turn to potential private moni-
tors. The first candidate we consider is nonprofits themselves. Self-enforcement 
has proven successful in a remarkable variety of markets where trust is an issue, 
ranging from the broker-dealer industry,184 to dairy milk,185 to law186 and medi-
cal practice,187 to food and nutrition dietitians,188 to the real estate market.189 
Commentators, on occasion, have hoped that perhaps nonprofits could be count-
ed upon to police their own activity as these other markets have done.190 
                                                                                                                           
181 See generally Chye-Ching Huang, Depletion of IRS Enforcement Is Undermining the Tax 
Code, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/federal-tax/
depletion-of-irs-enforcement-is-undermining-the-tax-code [https://perma.cc/MG75-LK5X] (noting 
that, from 2010 through 2018, there was a 24% decrease in enforcement budget and 31% decrease in 
enforcement personnel). 
182 See, e.g., IRS: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, INTERNAL REV. SERV., ANNUAL REPORT 2019 
(2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2019_irs_criminal_investigation_annual_report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5HXR-WE6E] (reporting no criminal investigations against exempt organizations); TREAS-
URY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., TRENDS IN COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES THROUGH FISCAL 
YEAR 2018, at 6 (2019), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2019reports/201930063fr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WQ3S-SLE3] (reporting that 5.4% of examination and collection staffing are devot-
ed to tax-exempt and government entities combined); Joel N. Crouch, Update on IRS Civil Enforce-
ment Priorities, MEADOWS COLLIER: MC TALKS TAX BLOG (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.meadows
collier.com/update-on-irs-civil-enforcement-priorities [https://perma.cc/7BQA-T8JU] (reporting five 
areas of IRS enforcement focus, none of which include exempt organizations); Program and Empha-
sis Areas for IRS Criminal Investigation, INTERNAL REV. SERV., https://www.irs.gov/compliance/
criminal-investigation/program-and-emphasis-areas-for-irs-criminal-investigation [https://perma.cc/
TF7C-6QSZ] (Mar. 5, 2021) (stating that there are sixteen program and emphasis areas for criminal 
investigation, none of which include exempt organizations). 
183 Mayer, supra note 179, at 99 (“Nor is a significant increase in resources for the exempt organ-
izations function [within the IRS] likely in the foreseeable future . . . .”). 
184 About FINRA, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/about [https://perma.cc/K7U5-N6A4]. 
185 The REAL Seal Story, REAL, https://www.realseal.com/the-real-story/ [https://perma.cc/
YH6U-X7TN]. 
186 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl., para. 10–12 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). Contra Fred C. 
Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 1148 (2009) (contending that legal 
practice is also subject to external regulation). 
187 William D. White, Professional Self-Regulation in Medicine, 16 AMA J. ETHICS 275, 275 
(2014), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/sites/journalofethics.ama-assn.org/files/2018-05/hlaw1-
1404.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KYN-D5KL]. 
188 Registered Dietitian (RD) or Registered Dietitian Nutritionist (RDN) Certification, COMM’N 
ON DIETETIC REGISTRATION, https://www.cdrnet.org/certifications/registered-dietitian-rd-certification 
[https://perma.cc/PQS4-8UEP]. 
189 About NAR, NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS, https://www.nar.realtor/about-nar [https://perma.
cc/M78B-CUT4]. 
190 See, e.g., Swords, supra note 86, at 579. 
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There is potentially much to be gained by robust nonprofit self-
enforcement. Nonprofits, through their legal nondistribution constraint, make a 
credible commitment to providing high-quality goods and services, which has 
market value when traditional entities cannot be trusted to do so.191 Because 
their competitive market advantage comes from encouraging trust from con-
sumers in their services, nonprofits as a group have an interest in maximizing 
that trust through robust protection of the nonprofit brand.192 Others have not-
ed the “warm glow” that people may feel when interacting with charitable non-
profits.193 Publicized instances of nonprofit malfeasance can undermine the trust 
value from choosing the nonprofit form, leaving the organization saddled with 
the disadvantages of a nonprofit while unable to capitalize on the benefits.194 
Yet attempts by nonprofits to police themselves have failed, seemingly 
surprising those who recognize the potential for its success.195 We think much 
of this failure likely stems from the same commons problem plaguing state 
attorney general enforcement—the benefits from robust enforcement accrue to 
nonprofits as a whole, while the costs are borne by the enforcer.196 Coordina-
tion will be difficult to achieve given the number of nonprofit entities that 
would require coordination. The United States has well over one million non-
                                                                                                                           
191 See supra Part I.A. 
192 See, e.g., Swords, supra note 86, at 579 (“[T]he exposure of cases of abuse and corruption by 
nonprofit organizations is very likely to have caused an erosion in the public’s confidence in the sec-
tor. It may then be in the sector’s interest to help ferret out these problems.”). 
193 Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1222 (2010) (identifying the 
“warm glow” experienced by employees at nonprofits); Rodrigues, supra note 100, at 1259 (arguing 
for the importance of the nonprofit “warm glow” among a variety of groups that interact with nonprof-
its). 
194 See Hansmann, supra note 26, at 875 (“[T]he potential for [abuses] weaken[s] the nonprofit 
form by undermining its effectiveness as a response to contract failure.”); id. at 877–79 (summarizing 
costs of adopting the nonprofit form); Mark Sidel, The Guardians Guarding Themselves: A Compara-
tive Perspective on Nonprofit Self-Regulation, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 803, 804 (2005) (“The failure to 
condemn [wayward nonprofits] has weakened social support for the nonprofit sector . . . .”); Swords, 
supra note 86, at 579 (noting the problems for nonprofits as a whole suffering from instances of bad 
actors). 
195 Sidel, supra note 194, at 834; see Swords, supra note 86, at 579–80 & n.28 (describing limited 
attempts by nonprofits in the 1990s to provide self-regulation). This is not to say nonprofit self-
enforcement is destined to fail. See, e.g., Mary Kay Gugerty, The Emergence of Nonprofit Self-Regula-
tion in Africa, 39 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 1087 (2010) (analyzing nonprofit self-
regulation in several African countries); Aseem Prakash & Mary Kay Gugerty, Trust but Verify?: Volun-
tary Regulation Programs in the Nonprofit Sector, 4 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 22, 42 (2010) (analyzing a 
variety of nonprofit self-regulation programs); Mark Sidel, State Regulation and the Emergence of Self-
Regulation in the Chinese and Vietnamese Nonprofit and Philanthropic Sectors, in REGULATORY 
WAVES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON STATE REGULATION AND SELF-REGULATION POLICIES IN 
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (Oonagh B. Breen et al. eds., 2017) (analyzing nonprofit self-regulation in 
China and Vietnam); Sidel, supra note 194, at 813–25 (analyzing nonprofit self-regulation in a variety of 
countries). 
196 See supra notes 160–162 and accompanying text. 
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profits,197 and coordination becomes more difficult as the number and geo-
graphic area of entities to be coordinated expands, because monitoring and 
sanctioning free-riders becomes prohibitively difficult.198 
Another explanation for self-regulation’s failure may lie in its minimal 
benefit for most established nonprofits, which are the firms with the greatest 
means to implement such a solution. The trust provided by the nondistribution 
constraint can be provided through alternative methods, particularly a firm’s 
reputation and record of treating patrons fairly.199 If reputation and the nondis-
tribution constraints are substitutable means for nonprofits to generate trust, 
then we would generally expect the nondistribution constraint to be important 
for new nonprofits, but less important once the firm has developed a reputation 
over years of operation.200 If true, then the firms that have the most interest in 
robust self-enforcement are the new, unestablished firms with little meaningful 
                                                                                                                           
197 See, e.g., IRS, CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, TAX YEAR 2015, at 1 
(2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5331.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2AE-MTB7] (reporting 1.1 
million exempt nonprofits). 
198 See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 46 (1971) (“[C]osts of organization are an increasing function of the number of 
individuals in the group.”). 
199 See, e.g., Herrington J. Bryce, The Public’s Trust in Nonprofit Organizations: The Role of Re-
lationship Marketing and Management, 49 CAL. MGMT. REV., July 2007, at 112, 112 (“The public’s 
positive or negative experiences in core transactions with an organization may be the principal bases 
for the impairment or improvement of the public trust.”); Claire A. Hill, Marshalling Reputation to 
Minimize Problematic Business Conduct, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1193, 1207–13 (2019) [hereinafter Hill, 
Marshalling Reputation] (summarizing evidence on reputation’s value to companies); Claire A. Hill, 
Repetition, Ritual, and Reputation: How Do Market Participants Deal with (Some Types of) Incom-
plete Information?, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 515, 523–24 (analyzing the complementary roles served by 
repeated interactions, norms, and reputation in contracting problems); Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean 
Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 61, 76 (Richard 
Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989); Kishanthi Parella, Public Relations Litigation, 72 VAND. L. 
REV. 1285, 1296 (2019) (“A corporate reputation influences [patrons’] decisions to provide or with-
hold their resources; therefore, reputation has important competitive consequences.”). 
200 More generally, we would expect the nondistribution constraint to diminish in importance as 
the firm develops a valuable reputation that is costly to acquire. One necessary, but not sufficient 
component of satisfying this assumption, is operating for a period of time. See, e.g., Andreas Ortmann 
& Mark Schlesinger, Trust, Repute, and the Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, in THE STUDY OF NON-
PROFIT ENTERPRISE: THEORIES AND APPROACHES 77, 103 (Helmut K. Anheier & Avner Ben-Ner 
eds., 2003) (noting the need for repeated interaction and for strong information flows). This hypothe-
sis is consistent with some existing evidence about nonprofits that has otherwise been difficult to 
explain. For example, many established nonprofits fail to advertise their nonprofit status, but this is to 
be expected if the nondistribution constraint adds little value to their existing firm-specific reputation 
for trust. Malani & David, supra note 26, at 555. Additionally, patrons’ recognition of what it means 
to be a nonprofit, and their ability to identify correctly a firm as being nonprofit, is far from perfect, 
which again might be expected if patrons generally rely on reputation over nonprofit status as a signal 
for quality and trustworthiness. Steven E. Permut, Comment, Consumer Perceptions of Nonprofit 
Enterprise: A Comment on Hansmann, 90 YALE L.J. 1623, 1626–28 (1981). Contra Hansmann, supra 
note 26, at 896–97 (noting that not all individuals need conscious awareness of the nondistribution 
constraint’s implications for the nonprofit form to succeed). 
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power to do so, while the established nonprofits with the resources to imple-
ment such a solution will find little gains from doing so. Indeed, the powerful, 
established nonprofits, to the extent they are driven to maximize their market 
presence, may even have an interest in keeping out entry of new competitor 
firms by reducing the value of the nonprofit signal, leading them to actively 
resist such a coordinated solution.201 
Thus, even if coordination problems were not formidable, the nonprofits 
with the most means to pursue self-regulation arguably are the firms with the 
least interest in doing so. We must therefore continue our search for effective 
nonprofit monitors. 
5. Patrons 
Our search next brings us to other private parties who have an interest in 
reducing nonprofit agency costs. The first group we consider is the patrons of 
the firm who consume the firm’s products or services, providing the firm with 
its source of income. 
As a legal matter, private parties usually lack standing to sue the nonprof-
its or its officers directly for mismanagement of the company; the state attor-
neys general are the parties empowered to bring suit.202 Some states allow 
members of member-based nonprofits to sue the nonprofit derivatively,203 but 
in addition to having to satisfy standing requirements,204 three sizable barriers 
stand in the way of robust policing by derivative suits. 
The first is financial. Derivative suits work for traditional corporations 
because shareholders of the corporation have a financial interest in maximizing 
the value of their shares; derivative suits are one means of correcting wayward 
                                                                                                                           
201 Contra Hansmann, supra note 26, at 875–76 (positing ethical constraints on otherwise eco-
nomically rational nonprofit behavior). Moreover, in many industries, nonprofits compete not just 
with other nonprofit firms, but also with for-profit ones. Id. at 863 (“[C]ommercial nonprofits almost 
always operate in competition with proprietary firms that provide similar services . . . .”). For these 
nonprofits, the gains from keeping out entry of new nonprofits are more attenuated because of entry 
by competing for-profits. 
202 See, e.g., Brody, supra note 161, at 957; Hansmann, supra note 102, at 606–07. On occasion, 
standing can be expanded to private parties. See, e.g., Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. State, 840 
N.E.2d 68, 82 (N.Y. 2005) (noting that limited standing had been granted in a proposed merger of a 
nonprofit health insurer to private policyholders who faced premium increases). 
203 See, e.g., Fox v. Prof’l Wrecker Operators of Fla., 801 So. 2d 175, 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2001). See generally Thomas E. Rutledge, Who Will Watch the Watchers?: Derivative Actions in 
Nonprofit Corporations, 103 KY. L.J. ONLINE 31 (2015), https://www.kentuckylawjournal.org/online-
originals/index.php/2015/04/22/who-will-watch-the-watchers [https://perma.cc/5HC4-CB2J] (advo-
cating for the application of derivative suits to nonprofits even when statutes are silent on the issue). 
204 See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.30 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1987) (authorizing de-
rivative suits by the lesser of fifty members or by members collectively holding 5% of the voting 
power); see also, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3631 (2020) (authorizing derivative suits by the 
lesser of fifty members or by members collectively holding 25% of the voting power). 
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management and ensuring the corporation has maximal financial value.205 
Nonprofits, by law, have no owners and therefore no financial ownership inter-
est for members to maximize through derivative suits.206 Instead, members 
have a more attenuated incentive to bear the costs of suing if doing so would 
enable the nonprofit to pursue its company mission more effectively, which we 
suspect is difficult to satisfy.207 
The second is practical. In states that expand derivative standing beyond 
the state attorney general, standing is expanded only to a group of the nonprof-
it’s members. A nonprofit’s members, however, are only a subset of the patrons 
that have an interest in deterring nonprofit misbehavior.208 Some nonprofits 
have no members; these organizations therefore will go unpoliced by deriva-
tive suits unless those suits are brought by the attorney general or another direc-
tor. Other nonprofits have members but also have donors, customers, or benefi-
ciaries without membership rights; these parties’ potential to deter mismanage-
ment goes untapped, even if they have the initiative to sue. 
Given these difficulties, we suspect it far more likely that patrons will 
simply choose to patronize other firms more aligned with their desires rather 
than suing wayward management.209 This response will provide a modest mar-
ket check on general management inefficiency, but it will hardly deter the 
more egregious and troublesome cases of fraud and mismanagement that pro-
vide large potential gains to its perpetrators.210 
                                                                                                                           
205 See, e.g., Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Forgotten Derivative Suit, 61 VAND. L. REV. 387, 401–05 
(2008). 
206 See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text (describing the nonprofit nondistribution con-
straint). 
207 Still, non-financial incentives can be powerful motivators. See, e.g., Brian Galle, Valuing the 
Right to Sue: An Empirical Examination of Nonprofit Agency Costs, 60 J.L. & ECON. 413, 413 (2017) 
(noting that private foundations in which donors have standing to sue receive more donations and 
have lower administrative costs); Hansmann, supra note 102, at 609 (“[I]t is clear that patrons will 
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The third is practical as well. Nonprofits have a comparative advantage in 
situations where the quality of performance is difficult to verify (without third-
party certification) so that the value of trust is important; the nondistribution 
constraint makes it more likely that a nonprofit will provide higher quality 
goods and services in these situations.211 But these are precisely the circum-
stances where monitoring will be more difficult, making it unlikely that at least 
some patrons will have the means to identify indiscretions to bring suit against 
this category of nonprofits. 
6. The Media 
We next assess another potential private monitor: the media. The media 
have been responsible for identifying and publicizing high-profile cases of 
nonprofit misbehavior in the past, and given the response these stories can 
generate, it seems reasonable to assume that the media have the incentive to 
continue doing so.212 With the need to attract attention, however, it seems like-
ly that the media will police only the most egregious instances of agency costs, 
such as large scale frauds; lesser indiscretions that may be significant in the 
aggregate will not be publicized if they do not attract attention.213 
In the absence of traditional media monitoring nonprofits, social media 
takes a more important role. Many nonprofits use social media as a way to drive 
engagement with the nonprofit. Similarly, social media helps to build the brand. 
The ability of social media to change brand perception is an important part of 
brand value and brand strategy.214 Whereas traditional media requires reports 
as monitors, social media through crowdsourcing creates a new channel with 
which to monitor the behavior of nonprofits. 
7. Auditors 
Next, we consider the role that financial auditors might play. Auditors 
provide a gatekeeping function in the realm of publicly traded corporations, 
verifying a company’s financial condition that can both expose financial fraud 
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at an early stage as well as deter companies from engaging in fraud in the first 
place due to the threat of discovery.215 
Nonprofits are under no federal obligation to obtain audited financial re-
ports even if they are exempt;216 any obligation must instead come from state 
law. Twenty-six states impose some sort of audit requirement.217 These require-
ments are typically triggered by surpassing a minimum level of contributions, 
often on the order of $500,000 or $1 million.218 
Yet significant holes remain. Twenty-four states have no audit require-
ments.219 Even those states that do have requirements typically exempt nonprof-
its that do not rely on donations from the requirement.220 Nonprofits that do not 
traditionally rely on donations, such as nursing homes and hospitals, will there-
fore not be subject to the state-level requirement.221 Finally, the public does not 
always have access to audit reports that are filed pursuant to state require-
ments,222 leaving the information actionable only by state agencies who, for 
reasons already discussed, currently lack the incentive and means to do so.223 
III. TOWARD ROBUST NONPROFIT MONITORING 
Existing nonprofit monitors present a host of problems. Weak policing of 
both firm governance and nonprofits’ nondistribution constraint results not only 
in the provocative examples provided at this Article’s outset, but also under-
mines the legal essence of what it means to be a nonprofit organization. Given 
the size of nonprofit operations, the problems from largely autonomous and un-
monitored management can be severe. At the same time, we recognize that man-
agerial discretion is often necessary to carry out the balancing of diverse constit-
uency interests in which nonprofits often engage. We therefore propose three 
solutions that we hope will address governance problems, while respecting the 
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unique spaces in which nonprofit management often operates. Section A of this 
Part discusses potential options for disclosure and private certification.224 Sec-
tion B proposes more streamlined oversight by state attorneys general.225 Finally, 
Section C discusses the potential impact of federal nonprofit monitoring.226 
A. Disclosure and Private Certification 
We first consider disclosure and private certification, which we envision 
working together to enhance monitoring of nonprofit governance. Although 
Henry Hansmann first suggested disclosure of annual financial statements and 
conflicted transactions as a solution in 1981, and others have suggested it since 
that time,227 the mechanisms and empirical understanding of disclosure have 
progressed significantly, particularly in the for-profit sector and the effects of 
Sarbanes-Oxley. Similarly, certification in other nonprofit contexts has been 
recommended before,228 but we extend this work in new directions by laying 
the groundwork for a more robust certification mechanism. 
We integrate the empirical learning on disclosures and certification to 
craft an administrable proposal for nonprofit disclosure that provides needed 
improvements for nonprofits without imposing overly burdensome costs. Simi-
larly, third-party certification regimes have become more nuanced and practi-
cal, particularly given advancements in the corporate social responsibility and 
environmental, social, governance (CSR/ESG) space that have been studied in 
detail in operations,229 management,230 economics,231 and law.232 These third-
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party certification regimes have proven resilient in their ability to craft incen-
tives and reward users in ways that we think also could be fruitfully applied to 
the problem of nonprofit governance.233 
1. Disclosure 
Disclosure plays an important role in governance. Unlike prior papers that 
address disclosure, we focus our disclosure recommendations specifically on 
disclosures that will improve monitoring. Broadly, disclosure of information 
makes it easier for the public at large to police agency costs.234 Currently, as 
we discussed above, there is no disclosure system that applies to nonprofits 
across the board; disclosure requirements (if any) vary by state and by the 
nonprofit’s tax-exempt status. Policing nonprofit governance could be accom-
plished better through a broader disclosure requirement of nonprofit finances 
as well as the establishment of risk, executive pay, and audit committees. As we 
emphasized in the Introduction, we think these requirements should be linked to 
a size or revenue threshold to refrain from introducing overly burdensome re-
quirements on small nonprofits. Thus, there would be more, and different, in-
formation disclosed than through various types of financial and other disclo-
sures that some nonprofits already make through Forms 990. 
Disclosure makes reputational penalties strong. Disclosure allows reputa-
tional penalties to play a quasi-regulatory function by penalizing bad actors for 
their poor judgment and oversight. Reputational penalties have long been stud-
ied as a form of deterrence in other contexts. In one of the first studies that 
surveyed the empirical literature of reputational penalties (albeit only in fi-
nance and economics and based on a certain definition of an “event” for 
study), Jon Karpoff found that reputational penalties are significant when a 
regulator can reveal wrongdoing by a firm against its customers or investors.235 
More recent work by John Armour, Colin Mayer, and Andrea Polo finds that 
the deterrence effect of reputational penalties is roughly nine times the size of 
corresponding fines. Such reputational penalties also focus on conduct that 
affects customers or investors.236 
                                                                                                                           
232 Ofer Eldar, Designing Business Forms to Pursue Social Goals, 106 VA. L. REV. 937, 951 
(2020); Galle, supra note 228, at 31 (noting limits of certification regimes as well). 
233 Mayer, supra note 179, at 120 (suggesting concern as to third-party nonprofit certification). 
234 Angel Hsu et al., Comment, Mobilize Citizens to Track Sustainability, 508 NATURE 33, 34–35 
(2014). 
235 Jonathan M. Karpoff, Does Reputation Work to Discipline Corporate Misconduct?, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 361, 368 (Michael L. Barnett & Timothy G. Pol-
lock eds., 2012). 
236 John Armour et al., Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial Markets, 52 
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1429, 1429 (2017). 
1536 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1497 
Legal scholarship has pushed for reputational sanctions of corporations in 
other contexts. For example, Claire Hill advocates for increased reputational 
sanctions given the limitations of traditional legal recourse against bad behav-
ior by firms.237 Her arguments concentrate on institutional investors and for-
profit governance. 
In many cases, reputational penalties are increasing for organizations due 
to social media and crowdsourcing on the internet. For example, in the same 
week, Starbucks moved from banning Black Lives Matter t-shirts for their em-
ployees to actually printing them up for all employees to wear because of sig-
nificant and immediate pressure from its stakeholders.238 
We think that the potential for reputational penalties is potentially even 
greater in the nonprofit context. Reputation and trust matter arguably more for 
at least some nonprofits than for-profits, because the nonprofit form, through 
its nondistribution constraint, can have a comparative advantage in industries 
where trust and reputation are particularly important.239 
To leverage reputation’s ability to promote more effective nonprofit gov-
ernance, we envision expanding disclosure to concentrate on key governance 
risks. As with publicly traded companies’ SEC-mandated risk disclosures, 
nonprofit risk disclosures would assist interested stakeholders and the public in 
evaluating which nonprofits to patronize. A prospective law student choosing 
between two similar schools, for example, might lean toward the one that has 
meaningful plans for weathering unexpected revenue declines without devalu-
ing the diploma credential that will assist the student in attaining employ-
ment.240 These disclosures also will help with outside monitoring, highlighting 
companies whose directors are not focused on these issues and which might 
have the most severe governance failures. 
We envision these disclosures as detailing self-interested approved trans-
actions as well as providing narrative information about risk management is-
sues, such as the Item 1A in a 10-K SEC filing and Item 3’s Legal Proceedings 
narratives from for-profit companies. As an alternative, we envision nonprofits 
being able to opt out of the filing by explaining, in narrative form, why a de-
tailed disclosure of business risk is not warranted. 
Disclosures that target risk send important signals about how society ex-
pects nonprofits to operate. The current Form 990 system, which inquires into 
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a number of issues in nonprofit governance but omits key questions about risk 
assessment, sends a message to nonprofits that risk management is of only 
secondary importance. Required disclosures of narratives about those risks or, 
alternatively, narratives about why those risks need not be considered, ensure 
that at least some amount of managerial attention is paid to deterring these in-
stances of governance failures. 
Although disclosure of risk is effective for publicly traded for-profit com-
panies,241 some might note that privately held for-profit companies do not have 
to disclose risks. Why then are nonprofit governance problems different from 
those of privately held for-profits to justify disclosure? Our answer derives 
from the fact that for-profits lack the same monitoring problems as nonprofits. 
Owners, investors, and takeover threats serve as effective, if imperfect, con-
straints on for-profit governance misconduct that nonprofits lack.242 Hence, by 
requiring a statement on risk, this requirement forces nonprofit management to 
confront these issues. 
2. Certification 
It is difficult for outside stakeholders to identify the quality of organiza-
tions.243 This is particularly true when those organizations are nonprofits, 
whose nondistribution constraint leads them to thrive in trust industries.244 Cer-
tification by third parties offers a market-based solution to address the infor-
mation asymmetry issue that emerges about whether a given nonprofit can be 
trusted to have reasonable governance and constraints. 
Certification, in turn, allows for credible, digestible signaling of quality 
governance by those organizations that receive a certifier’s approval.245 When 
firms receive certification, this reduces information asymmetries, as certifica-
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tion provides a signal that the firm in question is compliant with legal and reg-
ulatory requirements.246 
This signal reduces uncertainty regarding doing business with such firms. 
Without such certification, there are increased transaction costs because of the 
lack of trust between a firm and the stakeholders in its business relation-
ships.247 For nonprofits, such as hospitals and universities, this signaling pro-
vides credible reassurance of the organization’s trustworthiness that otherwise 
may be hidden to external parties or may be non-credible.248 
Information asymmetries can be larger in nonprofits relative to for-profits 
because of nonprofits’ dissimilar disclosure requirements for publicly traded 
firms (and the agency costs are greater than privately held firms with less dis-
closure), a lack of functioning markets for takeovers and managers, and less 
effective monitoring by auditors. Among for-profits, incentive-based pay and 
the market for managers deter managerial opportunism, as managers who seek 
to maximize their executive pay or climb the pay and prestige ladders to larger 
for-profit firms must refrain from abusing their managerial positions.249 
Among nonprofits, however, incentive-based pay is rare,250 and empirical evi-
dence suggests that the market for managers is less tethered to diligent pursuit 
of the nonprofit’s mission.251 Further, among public for-profits, hostile corpo-
rate takeovers and activist investors correct particularly wayward management 
by replacing it with directors who will better maximize the value of the firm.252 
Nonprofits, however, have no stock and thus no hostile takeovers or activist 
investors. Certification can therefore prove particularly valuable in this space 
by reducing the costs of conveying credible quality signals to the public, al-
lowing those firms with good governance to signal it through certification to 
their stakeholders. 
Certification can be done via government in a regulatory setting, by third 
parties through self-governance, or with third-party monitoring encouraged by 
government. All three already occur in different contexts. Government certifi-
cation occurs, for example, with certification of training, such as the Depart-
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ment of Transportation Transit Safety and Security Program. This program cer-
tifies the training of individuals for safety in transport.253 Third-party certifica-
tion may be encouraged by regulatory bodies, such as the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency energy star program.254 Finally, certification may be entirely a 
private function, such as in environmental or labor standards255 or auditing.256 
We advocate third-party private certification for a certification-based so-
lution to nonprofit governance. Private certification allows for robust competi-
tion specifically tailored to corporate governance, as already occurs in the for-
profit context through proxy advisory organizations such as International 
Shareholder Services or Glass-Lewis.257 Moreover, the rise of interest in ESG 
has shown private certification’s ability to respond to social and governance 
issues through a variety of avenues spanning multiple private actors ranging 
from investment advisors to formal certifiers.258 
Nevertheless, a private certification system faces several hurdles that 
would need to be overcome. One is to ensure the presence of sufficient market 
demand to support a private solution; one might think that the absence of pri-
vate certifiers in this area suggests a lack of interest by nonprofit customers in 
this information. Yet the success of nonprofit-focused ratings agencies, such as 
Charity Navigator, suggest a private appetite for this type of information.259 
Charity Navigator’s ratings have been criticized, however, for failing to cap-
ture true governance issues,260 and the ratings lack the nuance that might adjust 
for an individual’s particularized tastes about various aspects of nonprofit op-
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erations, instead applying one single ratings methodology to all organiza-
tions.261 We sense a market opportunity for other certifiers who offer flexible 
approaches to cater to nonprofit patrons’ particular tastes.262 
A private certification system must also avoid the problem of conveying a 
false signal about an organization’s activities in an effort to attract certification 
business. This worry is a concern in all certification regimes, with “greenwash-
ing” of firms’ environmental or social characteristics, and credit ratings, being 
two familiar examples.263 Jodi Short and Michael Toeffel have shown that situ-
ations involving self-dealing, where third-party monitors are paid directly by 
the firms being certified, are particularly problematic.264 For example, they 
find that monitoring of global supply chain compliance is less stringent when 
payment comes from the firm being audited,265 or other potential conflicts of 
interest.266 The key component of a nonprofit certification system, then, is to 
align incentives among the certifier, the party it certifies, and the parties for 
whom the certification has value. 
Others have already considered how to solve this problem in the related 
context of social enterprise, using a mixture of public and private methods, and 
we think those lessons would carry over to the general nonprofit governance 
context well.267 For instance, we might have a rotating panel of certifiers for 
any particular firm, or a legal system of liability for false certifications.268 To 
be sure, this raises the cost of entry to the certification market, resulting in a 
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potentially more highly concentrated certification market.269 The lack of com-
petition may reduce quality of certification.270 Without checks on the quality of 
certification, however, the incentive to certify falsely nonprofits’ compliance 
with various types of regulation, or to overplay the effectiveness of the certifi-
cation,271 may be too significant. 
A final hurdle for a certification-based solution is to generate buy-in from 
existing nonprofits. We expect it could take considerable time—years—for a 
particular certification system to gain traction, requiring proponents to be will-
ing to invest significant time in this solution. At first, before the certification 
has gained meaningful recognition among nonprofit patrons, there would be 
little reason for nonprofits to invest meaningful effort or expense in opting into 
a certification system. Moreover, because established nonprofits likely rely 
more on their firm-specific reputation to generate trust from patrons than the 
value of a certification,272 it may be difficult to attract the type of well-known, 
highly visible nonprofits that could help the certification gain initial success.273 
B. State Attorneys General 
We also consider a solution built upon the existing oversight framework 
supplied by the state attorneys general. States already give their attorneys gen-
eral the legal power to oversee the operations of charities within their borders, 
so beginning with this existing authority could be useful. At the same time, 
state attorneys general currently provide only weak oversight, so significant 
changes are warranted. 
1. The Benefits of a Unitary Oversight System 
The challenge, as we identified above, concerns particularly larger non-
profits whose operations cross state lines.274 For these organizations, the costs 
of oversight are borne entirely by the single monitoring state attorney general, 
whereas the benefits accrue to all. The rational state attorney general, in decid-
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ing how much effort to exert in policing these nonprofits, considers the bene-
fits only of the attorney general’s state’s citizens.275 A state attorney general 
therefore devotes comparatively less attention to overseeing organizations with 
interstate operations than would be optimal given the full scope of these organ-
izations’ operations. 
Achieving efficient levels of oversight requires attorneys general to in-
corporate the full national effect of nonprofit operations. Although this prob-
lem could be solved by building robust coordination among state attorneys 
general offices, as a practical matter coordination across this number of entities 
happens in only the most extraordinary circumstances,276 and we doubt wheth-
er most would view nonprofit monitoring as sufficiently extraordinary. 
We therefore suggest a new approach: making only a single state attorney 
general responsible for the oversight of each nonprofit. Following this ap-
proach eliminates the difficulties that arise from coordinating among multiple 
oversight entities. Which state attorney general should monitor? We consider 
three natural candidates. 
2. Which State Should Monitor? 
Two natural contenders arise for choosing the monitoring state: (1) the 
nonprofit’s state of incorporation, and (2) the state in which the nonprofit has 
its most significant operations. We think the state of incorporation is the better 
choice for the state whose attorney general will monitor. The potential ad-
vantages of this approach have been studied extensively in the context of Del-
aware’s success at attracting business incorporations, and many of those les-
sons carry over to the current proposal.277 Rather than comprehensively repeat-
ing that literature here, we simply provide its high notes. 
Allowing companies to choose their state of incorporation, and conse-
quently the legal system that will govern internal disputes, encourages states to 
compete with one another278 to attract incorporations because more incorpora-
tions means more fees and power for the state.279 To encourage formations, 
states have to offer a package of benefits that is attractive to companies. For 
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traditional, for-profit entities, this package generally consists of a high-quality 
legal system—the statutory law, the courts that apply that law, and the legisla-
ture that drafts that law—that offers robust investor protection and, conse-
quently, the lowest cost of capital to organizations.280 
Much of this argument carries over to nonprofits. Although they lack tra-
ditional shareholders, nonprofits nevertheless need to attract capital. Nonprof-
its might have an easier time raising capital from donors if their governing 
state provides a meaningful set of donor protections, which Brian Galle has 
shown can help attract donations.281 Nonprofits also might gain more favorable 
debt terms if state oversight improves nonprofit governance and reduces the 
probability of bankruptcy. States could offer protection through their statutes, 
such as giving donors the right to sue;282 or through a legislature that can be 
trusted to respond to evolving donor and governance needs of the future;283 or 
through a state attorney general who can be relied upon to monitor and enforce 
optimal nonprofit governance that minimizes agency costs.284 Because it is 
fairly easy to change one’s state of incorporation,285 basing monitoring on the 
incorporation state could provide for healthy competition among states to at-
tract nonprofit business, and therefore the greatest potential for an optimal reg-
ulatory system.286 
There are also merits, however, to choosing the state in which the non-
profit has its largest presence as the monitoring state, rather than the state of 
formation. Depending on how it is ultimately defined, this could be the state in 
which the nonprofit locates its headquarters, or the state from which the non-
profit derives most of its revenue, or the state whose citizens contribute the 
largest share of donations to the nonprofit (if it relies on donations). Whichever 
combination of these factors is chosen, we could imagine the attorney general 
in that state may have an easier time monitoring the nonprofit, given the close 
geographic proximity to some of the problematic behavior that may result. We 
note, however, that many of the problems we identify stem from problematic 
corporate governance issues, and it is not immediately clear how geographic 
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proximity can help police these.287 Moreover, it is considerably more difficult 
for firms to change monitors under this alternative specification,288 making 
competition among states to attract organizations—and the resulting hope for 
optimal oversight—less vigorous. At the same time, difficulty in switching 
monitors reduces the chance for suboptimal gaming of monitors, reducing the 
chance that states might compete to attract nonprofits by minimizing oversight. 
3. Why States Would Monitor 
Whichever method is adopted to select the monitoring state attorney gen-
eral, the next challenge is to incentivize that official to care about a nonprofit’s 
operations outside the attorney general’s state’s borders to encourage appropri-
ate levels of costly oversight. Under the current system, state attorneys general 
internalize the effects only on their state citizens. We must therefore expand 
the lens. 
We do so by appealing to state finances. Outside the nonprofit context, 
one explanation for states’ interest in attracting corporate formations is the sig-
nificant revenue that states derive from the fees those businesses pay. Dela-
ware, for example, obtains over twenty-five percent of all its taxes from its 
franchise fees paid by companies incorporated or otherwise formed in Dela-
ware.289 If robust state attorney general oversight is a desirable characteristic 
for nonprofits—it could reduce capital costs290 and promote stakeholder trust 
by strengthening the nondistribution constraint’s commitment291—then a simi-
lar story could unfold here as well, with states encouraged to engage in mean-
ingful monitoring so they can attract nonprofits and their formation fees. As 
states grow more successful in becoming the location of choice for nonprofits, 
they could increase their nonprofit franchise fees to cover these monitoring 
costs, with excess fees used to fund other desirable state programs.292 
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In essence, then, the state attorney general could mirror some of the value 
provided by private certification.293 And as discussed in the context of this ear-
lier solution, there are a number of challenges in convincing nonprofits to buy 
into the system, as well as getting those who interact with the nonprofit to 
know both the state that regulates the nonprofit’s activity and the implications 
that this regulation has for the nonprofit’s behavior.294 
Yet the space of regulatory certification is full of examples where these 
challenges have been overcome. We next give particular color to one of these 
success stories from insurance solvency regulation, which has overcome similar 
problems that would be faced by state attorney general monitoring of nonprofits. 
4. A Success Story from Insurance Solvency Regulation 
Insurance solvency regulation serves as an instructive example for over-
coming collective action challenges in having state attorneys general monitor 
nonprofits. Within the United States, the federal government leaves states to 
regulate the fiscal healthiness of insurance companies.295 Each state maintains 
the power to regulate the solvency of all insurers that do business within its 
borders,296 but the same collective action problems that plague state attorneys 
general in the nonprofit context imply that solvency regulation efforts by in-
surance regulators will be suboptimally low. The cost of monitoring interstate 
insurers is borne by the individual regulator, but those efforts benefit citizens 
of other states. Moreover, requiring insurers to comply with differing yet over-
lapping solvency requirements in each individual state in which they conduct 
business can be administratively costly and unnecessary, just as forcing non-
profits to comply with fundraising disclosures and other restrictions in every 
state where they conduct business can be duplicative.297 State insurance regula-
tors have therefore coordinated their system of solvency regulation, and only 
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one state monitors an insurer’s solvency in a system. These coordinated efforts 
are generally viewed as successful.298 
As with nonprofits, state insurance regulators face the same two problems 
of choosing a single state regulator to monitor solvency and ensuring that the 
regulator’s monitoring reflects nationwide policyholder risk, rather than merely 
the risk within one state. Insurance regulators solve the first problem by placing 
the regulator of the insurer’s domiciliary state, analogous to the state of for-
mation for nonprofits, in charge of solvency monitoring.299 Although alternative 
ways could have been used to designate the overseeing state, there are benefits to 
having the domiciliary state be in charge. Insurers can change their domiciliary 
state,300 and this threat of exit encourages regulators to offer an attractive pack-
age to maintain the economic benefits of retaining domiciled insurers.301 
Regulators have solved the second problem of ensuring sufficient regula-
tory effort by jointly agreeing on a minimum set of solvency standards for each 
state regulator to apply. States are subjected to extensive audits to ensure com-
pliance with the standard.302 The consequences of failing the audit are severe; 
if a state loses its accreditation, then its domestic insurers will move to other, 
accredited states, taking their economic influence with them.303 
State regulators may depart above (but not below) this required minimum 
baseline and implement heightened standards, and there is some market incentive 
for them to do so.304 Some policyholders and other market participants may value 
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doing business with more heavily regulated insurers, leading state regulators to 
implement higher standards to attract business to their state.305 Additionally, in-
surance regulators are required to seize and wind down domiciled insurers that 
fail solvency tests, with losses funded through a prospective assessment on other 
insurers in the state.306 Seizures and accompanying financial assessments do not 
make insurers especially well-liked by their regulated constituents,307 giving them 
reason to monitor and prevent insolvencies to avoid having to intervene.308 
To be sure, there are meaningful differences between insurer solvency 
regulation and oversight of nonprofit entities. Yet the success in the insurance 
context suggests similar coordination could be achieved in the nonprofit space. 
5. Two Challenges 
Before concluding, we consider what we think are two of the most signif-
icant unique challenges in designing a state attorney general-led solution.309 
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a. The Scope of Oversight 
Foremost among the remaining challenges involves defining the scope of 
regulatory involvement. To deploy limited regulatory capital in its most pro-
ductive manner, we recommend extending oversight along two dimensions. 
The first involves policing the nonprofit nondistribution constraint. As identi-
fied throughout this Article, the nondistribution constraint provides the legal 
difference between nonprofit and for-profit firms.310 Weak enforcement of this 
constraint means that, for practical purposes, the line between nonprofit and for-
profit firms can become considerably blurred. Robust oversight of this essential 
attribute of nonprofit firms can help the collective nonprofit sector by promoting 
the trust that the form can have a comparative advantage in generating. 
The second dimension of oversight should involve flagging the most 
egregious cases of agency cost abuse, such as fraud or illegal conduct. Curbing 
these clear cases should provide significant value, while minimizing concerns 
of regulatory overreach that could otherwise result if regulators began ques-
tioning firms’ ordinary business decisions. 
We recognize that governance failures below these high bars are still 
troubling, and to police them we suggest relying on the existing, imperfect 
monitors identified in Part II. Aiding those existing monitors brings up a poten-
tial third suggested dimension of attorney general oversight: monitoring non-
profit disclosures, such as those made through Form 990 or that we recom-
mend above.311 Disclosure serves little value if it cannot be relied upon as ac-
curate. Oversight by state attorneys general would effectively act as an addi-
tional certification mechanism for these disclosures.312 State attorneys general 
have an interest in trustworthy nonprofits forming within their state and there-
fore in accurate disclosures.313 They are thus a party who would be motivated 
to make sure these disclosures, which are designed to promote trustworthy 
nonprofits, are accurate.314 
b. Preventing a Race to the Bottom 
Earlier in this Part, we identified the financial incentives that might lead 
state attorneys general to “race to the top” in offering comprehensive nonprofit 
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oversight.315 What of the worry that states might respond by “racing to the bot-
tom,” encouraging bad governance by attracting nonprofit formations through 
offering minimal oversight that allows those nonprofits to engage in opportun-
ism? 
Preventing this undesirable outcome could be done with some coordina-
tion among the states. Happily, the state attorneys general have already devel-
oped a centralized organization that can help facilitate this coordination: the 
National Association of Attorneys General.316 Following the example of insur-
ance solvency regulation, we could imagine the attorneys general agreeing on 
a minimum baseline approach to nonprofit monitoring for all states to em-
ploy.317 To encourage states to offer that minimum baseline, nonprofits formed 
within a state meeting the baseline could be required to comply with oversight-
related provisions of only its formation state. As with insurance solvency regu-
lation, if states dip below this threshold, nonprofits would then have to comply 
with monitoring in all states in which they do business, leading nonprofits 
whose activities span state lines to shift their state of formation (and accompa-
nying revenue) to another compliant state.318 This solution that coerces states 
to comply thereby achieves a coordination goal long-sought by nonprofit firms 
and commentators.319 
An additional inducement could be added to ensure state compliance with 
a minimum standard, built on a principle of rewarding “carrots” or punishing 
“sticks.”320 The carrots-based approach would reward states that fulfill their 
oversight functions with particular success. If we measure success by the abil-
ity to attract nonprofit formations, then carrots could be supplied if a nonprof-
it’s formation state could collect money payments from other states where the 
nonprofit has activities. This payment might, for example, reflect the saved 
oversight that the non-formation state enjoys. 
Alternatively, sticks could be levied if states had guaranty funds that paid 
out when a domestic nonprofit was found to have engaged in misconduct, 
analogous to state solvency regulation guaranty funds. Even if the funds were 
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supplied by other domestic nonprofits, the pressure to refrain from assessing 
them could push for more diligent oversight by regulators, as it does with in-
surance solvency regulation.321 
Market forces also should provide some corrective force, even if states 
are unable to coordinate on a minimum baseline. Should state attorneys gen-
eral prove opportunistic with their enforcement targets, nonprofits could simp-
ly reincorporate (and bring associated revenue) to a state with a more princi-
pled enforcement regime. Similarly, a nonprofit might form in a state with lax 
oversight, but doing so sends a negative signal to donors and patrons who rely 
on good governance that the nonprofit should not be trusted, analogous to a 
for-profit firm’s decision to form in Nevada (with its weak governance re-
quirements) instead of Delaware.322 
Finally, the threat of federalizing nonprofit oversight consistently lurks in 
the background to deter state-based over- or under-ambitious oversight.323 In-
deed, several inroads have already been made by the IRS, evidencing federal 
oversight as a legitimate concern.324 Weak state enforcement therefore risks 
having state enforcement power coopted by a federal agency. 
Notably, any of these approaches that relies on state coordination would re-
quire states to give up some of their oversight power, which some states have 
been loath to do.325 We hope that the potential for significant welfare gains might 
be sufficient to overcome this resistance. Helpfully, nonprofit governance regula-
tion does not seem particularly salient to the public most of the time, increasing 
the potential that individual states and their elected regulators might be willing to 
relinquish some power to achieve desirable national coordination.326 
C. Federalizing Nonprofit Enforcement 
Finally, we briefly consider the potential for federalizing nonprofit moni-
toring. Rather than state-level action, federal-level action may be warranted 
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beyond existing federal tax regulation. Other countries with similar legal and 
market structures employ this approach. Australia relies on a public enforce-
ment body, the Australian National Charities Commission, in the nonprofit set-
ting, with enumerated oversight functions and disclosure requirements.327 Sim-
ilarly, England and Wales each have public charity commissions charged with 
nonprofit oversight.328 
The potential advantages of federal oversight are several. The IRS, a fed-
eral body, already conducts nonprofit oversight, and the existing apparatus 
could be adapted to meet these broader goals. Moreover, to the extent it is 
more immune from political pressure than state attorneys general might be, a 
federal overseer might address some of the concerns that have been raised with 
opportunistic attorney general enforcement.329 Finally, eliminating state com-
petition by federalizing nonprofit enforcement also eliminates the worry of a 
race to the bottom among states that might maximize their nonprofit formation 
business by minimizing nonprofit oversight. 
However, we expect that these advantages would be outweighed by the 
potential downsides. Most significantly, compared to an attorney general-led 
solution, a federal solution loses the element of competing for nonprofit incor-
porations, perhaps reducing the incentive to supply high-quality nonprofit law 
and services.330 It also relies on federal oversight being independent rather than 
targeting nonprofits for political or other reasons. Recent allegations of politi-
cally motivated IRS oversight of new nonprofit tax exemptions call this as-
sumption into question,331 and the rich literature on regulatory capture shows 
the problems from relying on only a single oversight body.332 Finally, federal 
oversight would impinge on corporate governance features that have long de-
rived solely from state law, and implementing such a fundamental shift would 
involve some serious heavy lifting.333 
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erally Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Fragmented Oversight of Nonprofits in the United States: Does It Work? 
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D. Measuring Nonprofit Effectiveness 
Because they may have goals beyond wealth maximization, nonprofits 
face a challenge of identifying the appropriate performance metrics to measure 
success; for-profit measures cannot just be applied to nonprofits with an expec-
tation of success. For-profits can measure success by growth, expected cash-
flows in the future, higher profit margins, or numerous accepted valuation 
benchmarks.334 Nonprofits may not want to grow, may value concepts, such as 
stakeholder engagement, and may have broad public policy goals independent 
of any profitability concerns. 
How then to assess what is “good” nonprofit governance? Some organiza-
tional structures already attempt to solve the effectiveness issue by laying out 
predetermined measurements. B Lab, which certifies B Corporations, has at-
tempted to measure the nebulous concept of social enterprise.335 Guidestar and 
Charity Navigator also attempt to measure specific financial-related aspects of 
nonprofit operations.336 These principles can be tailored to the nonprofit space 
for nonprofits for “high quality” governance as part of the standard setting that 
we discussed with regard to certification in Part III.A.2. 
Additionally, nonprofits can be measured, more modestly, in part for what 
they do not do, rather than what they do. That is, many fiduciary duties—in both 
the for-profit and nonprofit context—are based on negative duties (boards should 
not do certain things) rather than on positive duties to undertake certain actions. 
For example, the duty of care under Delaware law requires informed decision-
making, refraining from gross negligence.337 The duty of loyalty is the absence 
of self-dealing or lack of oversight.338 These negative duties provide a frame-
                                                                                                                           
Can It Work?, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 937 (2016) (discussing some advantages of dual state-federal 
oversight). 
334 A number of academics have suggested quantifying rankings to reflect effective corporate 
governance. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 
783, 783 (2009) (offering an alternative measure of quality of corporate governance, with a simplified 
set of six factors, which the authors link to performance); Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance 
and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 119 (2003) (creating a firm-level index in which the authors 
identified a correlation between anti-takeover measures and Tobin’s Q). These metrics do not work 
for nonprofit governance because they measure issues that typically apply in the for-profit setting. 
335 Suntae Kim & Todd Schifeling, Varied Incumbent Behaviors and Mobilization for New Or-
ganizational Forms: The Rise of Triple-Bottom Line Business Amid Both Corporate Social Responsi-
bility and Irresponsibility 7 (July 11, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=279
4335 [https://perma.cc/9GDB-QV6D]. 
336 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
337 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc. 683 A.2d 
1049, 1050 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
338 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 706–08 (Del. 2009) (en banc); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 
503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
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work for how to measure the minimum for what good governance in the non-
profit setting requires: the absence of particularly problematic behavior. 
CONCLUSION 
Nonprofits by their nature lack many of the monitors of managerial mis-
conduct that are enjoyed by for-profit organizations. This problem, although 
not novel, has persisted for decades without being addressed. We propose three 
attainable ways of tackling it with the goals of reinvigorating stakeholder trust 
in the nonprofit organizational form and of promoting better social outcomes 
across the variety of sectors in which nonprofits flourish. 
 
 
 
